Military Reform in South Sudan

General Description of the State of Affairs in South Sudan

On 9 July 2013, South Sudan celebrated the second anniversary of its independence. However, the secession did not bring peace or prosperity to the newly formed nation. Although most of the problems that plague Sudan and South Sudan were addressed by the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, these issues are still on the forefront today. The most prominent of these are borders disputes, inter-communal conflicts, and insurgencies.

South Sudan was born out of 20 years of civil war, which made it extremely economically weak after the secession. Thereafter, the fighting with the rebels and the general insecurity in South Sudan has caused about 223,636 refugees to flee, as reported on 30 June 2013 by UNHCR.[1] Since 98% of public sector revenue comes from exporting oil, South Sudan is highly vulnerable to oil price changes or to any interruptions in the exportation of oil.[2] Although there is a strong need for external investments in order to diversify the public sector revenue, it is very hard to attract it. Poor condition of the infrastructure due to the protracted conflict and the security instability hinders the possibility of any business and development investments. Moreover, only 27% of population is literate, which impedes the possibility of any real change coming from the inside the nation.[3] To make the matters worse, only “less than half of all primary school-age children are in school”, which ensures that next generations will be as dependent, if not even more dependent, on the outside help and investment.[4]

In addition, since South Sudan’s economy is mostly dependent on its oil exports, last year’s dispute over oil has further damaged the economy of South Sudan. Annual GDP growth was at 2% in 2010, but the oil dispute with Sudan that stopped oil exportation dropped the annual GDP growth to -56% in 2012.[5] 

Country Name	Country Code	Indicator Name	2010	2011	2012
South Sudan	SSD	GDP growth (annual %)	4.217333	1.929014	-55.8118

Source: World Development Indicators.

While most of the oil is in South Sudan, the infrastructure for export is in Sudan. Thus although that oil dispute ended only in April 2013, Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir has ordered another stoppage of oil transfers from South Sudan on 2 June 2013 for sixty days, because he believed that South Sudan is supporting rebels operating in Sudan.[6][7] For its part, South Sudan claims that Sudan is supporting the insurgency groups on South Sudanese soil.

However, on 1 July 2013, the Sudanese and South Sudanese governments signed an agreement that averted the second shut down of oil exportation.[8] Moreover, it reinstated the desire of both governments for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.[9] It highlighted their desire to refrain from supporting insurgent groups against the other side.[10] Lastly, the presidents reiterated their desire for immediate implementation of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan and South Sudan proposal that was created on 13 February 2013, which was meant to facilitate the talks between the two countries about oil, security, citizenship, assets, and their common border.[11] However, without genuine commitments and decisive action, all of these issues still are a concern for Sudan and South Sudan, which makes their relations and their nations highly insecure.

Although the relations with Sudan are still unstable and the internal security environment is troublesome, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) is putting serious effort into revamping its security sector to promote a feeling of security within its territory. In general terms, security sector includes: police services, military services, border services, justice services and ministries or organizations that oversee them. [12]  South Sudan’s security sector consist of the military (SPLA and Joint Integrated Units), the police, the border guards, the Wildlife Protection Service, the fire brigade, and the National Security Service. [13]

This essay will focus on the military aspect of security sector reform (SSR), which is defined by UN as “a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law”.[14] The first section will discuss the current security situation in the country in order to set the stage for the challenges facing SSR.  The second section will discuss specific reforms undertaken in military sector and the specific challenges that sector is facing. The third section will discuss current progress. The last section will suggest strategic policy options and give recommendations on how to proceed with the amelioration of the transformation process of the SPLA. 

Current Security Environment in South Sudan

Insurgencies

One of the biggest challenges to security in South Sudan is the frequent clashes between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the rebels. The most serious security threat is presented by a rebel group that is led by a Murle named David Yau Yau, who believes he lost local 2010 elections due to the corruption of the electoral process. From November to December 2012, the rebels were repeatedly fighting with the SPLA in Jonglei State around Pibor town, with casualties on both sides.[15] Furthermore, in December, the SPLA was engaged in fighting with the rebel group of the Lou Nuer “Prophet” Dak Kueth in Akobo County, and Uror County in January.[16]

The Yau Yau rebels have been attacking civilians. In February 2013, the Yau Yau rebels were responsible for the killing of 104 migrating civilians and 14 SPLA soldiers in Akobo County in Jonglei.[17] The rebels were recruiting people from the ethnic group Dinka in Boma order to help them to take over this sub-county. In early May, the rebels won over from the SPLA a section of Boma, called Marua, at which point the rebels numbered more than 3,000.[18] Boma is a very valuable region since it has many resources, but it not easily accessible for the SPLA; thus it was hard for the SPLA to increase its presence there. [19] However, in late May 2013, the army recaptured Boma from the rebels.[20] Many have fled from the surrounding areas. Recently, while the Murle community wanted to put down arms and negotiate with the government- as the rebel group called South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A) has done in April– Yau Yau was not submitting to the Presidents calls to accept the amnesty offer without the backing of the international community. [21][22] However, at the time of writing, the rebels were engaged in talks with the government to discuss the matter of amnesty and DDR.[23]

Inter-communal conflicts

                Another challenge to security is the inter-communal conflicts, usually over land or due to cattle raiding. In December 2012, in Wau Town, after the attempted move of county headquarters from Wau Town to Baggari District by the authorities, violence broke out between the security forces and the Fertit youth.[24] Later in the month, the discovery of six Dinka bodies caused a backlash by Dinka against Fertit, which resulted in several more deaths.[25] As many homes and business were burned, about 5, 000 civilians sought safety in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan compound.[26] On 16 December 2012, Kakwa and Dinka had a land dispute in Yei County, which ended with 53 houses being burned down.[27] Around the same time a land dispute between the Nuer and Mundari in Juba County resulted in the killing of two people.[28]

In January 2013, in Mvolo County, Dinka Atout raided the cattle belonging to Dinka Agar; the subsequent security concerns led many to flee to Western Equatoria.[29] In February 2013 in Jonglei, the tensions between Dinka, Lou Nuer and the Murle were growing. Lou Nuer were migrating their cattle with the escort of 14 soldiers, when they were attacked and many of them were killed.[30] In addition, seven people from security services were killed in Eastern Equatoria State on 13 April 2013 when they were responding to a cattle raid. The May cattle raiding in Koch, Mayom and Rubkona counties of Unity State left an unknown number dead.[31]  Lastly, in May 2013, the Jikany Nuer village was attacked during which many women and children were killed.[32]

The 8 March and 20 June 2013 Reports of the Secretary-General on South Sudan summarized well this inter-communal violence. The Secretary –General added that in the period between those two reports the inter-communal violence was on the rise due to high movement of cattle during dry season in the tri-State area of Lakes, Unity and Warrap States, in Jonglei State, and in Central and Eastern Equatoria States.[33]

Border Disputes

The border disputes between South Sudan and Sudan are high in oil producing states, such as Unity State and Upper Nile State. Indeed, in December 2011, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) were engaged in heavy fighting with the SPLA around Lake Jau, near Panaruu community of Unity State that falls under South Sudan’s control. [34] Furthermore, in early June 2013, South Sudan claimed that at least 3,000 troops entered the town of Kuake in Upper Nile State, which violated the 2012 cooperation agreement regarding the disputed border areas.[35] Additionally, in early July 2013, the South blamed SAF for air and ground attacks on Unity State and Upper Nile State, which SAF denies.[36] The SPLA in these areas has been on high alert for months. Another conflict area is around Kafia Kingi in Western Bahr el Ghazal, where regular SAF attacks have killed several SPLA soldiers in February 2012.[37] The north of this area shares a border with Sudan; and although it does not have oil, it does have rapids that could potentially produce enough electricity for the Bahr el Ghazal region.[38]

The resource rich Abyei Area has been a source of conflict between Sudan and South Sudan because both sides claim rights to the land. Weeks before the independence from Sudan, the area saw many deadly clashes between the two sides that caused more than 100,000 people to flee. [39] In order to mitigate the violence, the Security Council established United Nations Interim Force for Abyei (UNISFA). Although it started with a bit smaller number of peacekeepers, it increased its force to 5,326 peacekeepers as of 29 May 2013, as requested by Sudan and South Sudan. [40] After both governments withdrew their forces from the area, the peacekeepers came in to monitor the border between the north and the south and keep the area demilitarized.[41] 

Currently, South Sudan and Sudan cannot agree on what the interim administration of Abyei should look like or who can participate in its referendum on self-determination. On 14 June 2013, the Security Council issued a statement condemning the attack on UNISFA and the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, which resulted in the death of one peacekeeper, and two were wounded. [42] Although the Presidents of both countries met several times over the course of last year in order to discuss the status of Abyei, a quick survey of news headlines shows that the Presidents keep blaming the lack of consensus on the unwillingness of the other party to cooperate and to activate mechanisms for implementing the 27 September 2012 cooperation agreement. This agreement reinstated the parties’ commitments to follow through with the nine previous agreements one of which was “Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area”.[43] However, the inability of both parties to come to an agreement has made Abyei a hot security issue, which is becoming more alarming with the recent attack on UNISFA, the lack of consensus, and the date of Abyei referendum drawing close – October 2013.[44]

                                                                                                                                                                 

Security Sector Reform - Challenges and Accomplishments

                On the same day that South Sudan became independent, United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was established to support peace consolidation and help to develop South Sudan’s “capacity to provide security, to establish rule of law, and to strengthen the security and justice sectors.”[45] UNMISS created the UNMISS Rule of Law and Security Institutions Support Office (ROLSISO), which comprises of Justice Advisory, Military Justice Advisory, Corrections Advisory, and Security Sector Reform sections.[46] These sections are responsible for working with the GoSS, other national actors and international partners in order to revamp justice, military, corrections, and police sectors.

Military Sector - Challenges

                As in any post-conflict country, South Sudan’s army - the SPLA - dominates over all if the other security services.  In the beginning of the last year, the army was at around 150,000 soldiers, which in itself creates its own security concerns.[47] The fact that the soldiers were never properly screened or trained creates additional security problems on the top of the excessive number of soldiers.

 The SPLA soldiers are often reported for human rights abuses. Indeed, in January 2013, Human Rights Watch noted that in March 2012 disarmament operation in Jonglei the soldiers took part in “extrajudicial killings, severe beatings, tying people up with rope, and submerging their heads in water to extract information about the location of weapons” and in “sexual violence against women and girls”.[48]

One of the greatest challenges of professionalizing the SPLA is to stop the recruitment of child soldiers.  Few decades ago, the Red Army, which was made entirely of children, numbered around tens of thousands.[49] Although the Red Army does not exist anymore, there are still a lot of children that serve in the SPLA. The DDR process is not easy when it comes to children as some came to the SPLA because their families could not afford them, while others joined the army in hopes of better life. They are reluctant to leave or register, since without proper registration, it is harder for these children to be found and included in DDR process.[50]

                A lot of human right abuses by the SPLA are due to the fact that the SPLA was largely made of guerrilla fighters before the independence of South Sudan.[51] Although the GoSS turned these guerilla fighters into an army almost overnight, it did not mean their mentality changed to reflect that of a professional army. Thus the first order of business for the GoSS and its international partners was to transform the SPLA into a professional army.  An official plan - the SPLA Objective Force 2017 - that has been ratified by GOSS, MoDVA and SPLA was developed to transform the army and downsize it.[52] In 2012, new DDR program was created by the Republic of South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RSSD­DRC) that has a goal of putting up to 80 000 SPLA soldiers through the DDR process.[53]  Since this year’s estimates suggest that the SPLA numbers around 200, 000, they have an ambitious end goal of downsizing it to about 119,000.[54] The focus of the Objective Force is thus on disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating (DDR) the SPLA soldiers and other uniformed forces. Although the objective of DDR is “to reduce the size of the SPLA/SSAF and the other organized services, and assist the ex-combatants in returning to civilian life and creating sustainable livelihoods”, reintegration of the soldiers usually means a transfer to another security sector, such as SSPS or prison services, without any proper training.[55][56]

                In his paper “Work in Progress: Security Force Development in South Sudan through February 2013”, John A. Snowden points out that the SPLA lacks a comprehensive military strategy by identifying the following problems: a lack of specialization in the force, massive deployed over large area rather than concentrating on most urgent threat, and using disarmament to solve internal security problems rather than finding the cause of enemy’s power.[57] Their current strategy of attrition, which is a military strategy of wearing down the enemy by overwhelming them with numbers or fire power, is not an effective or efficient strategy.[58]

                Another issue in the military sector is a genuine lack of desire for making major changes to its force. For example, the SPLA does not consider that its “real fighters” should be in DDR program. It has around 20,000 soldiers that are no longer on duty, but they are still being paid by the government in Wounded Heroes program.[59] Since the SPLA decides who is included in DDR program, some commanders abuse it by using it to “offload those who had never fought or had joined following the Juba Declaration”, while others use it for those “individuals who had already left the SPLA but who deserved some support and recognition for their service.”[60] They are not considering putting the real fighters through DDR: for example, those who do not possess the traits needed to be a professional soldier.

Moreover, even though the goal of SSR in South Sudan is efficiency, in April 2011 the SPLA personnel received an increase in salary that almost doubled the original salary amount.[61] The SPLA salaries now make up more than 80 per cent of the defence budget, which is not sustainable in the long run.[62] Lastly, the SPLA is facing other financial issues that include “inflated strength, failure to define categories of personnel (for example, the status of the Wounded Heroes), incomplete payroll sheets, weak financial reporting, and the inclusion of non-military personnel on the payroll”.[63]

Military Sector Reform – Achievements

In order to professionalize the SPLA and make it accountable to the people, the GoSS created the Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs (MoDVA). This Ministry is responsible for preparing the budget for the SPLA, procuring its equipment, providing training, transforming into an accountable army and updating the GoSS on its activities.[64] Its current priorities are: “defending South Sudan against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and other threats; training the SPLA forces; establishment of headquarters at different levels; and building the capacities of SPLA in various areas of competence.”[65]

Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the Objective Force 2017 has been developed in order to specify the SPLA transformation end state.[66] In addition, the Transformation Strategy and Programme 2012-2017 was developed and ratified, which described the sequencing of this transformation process.[67] In order to deal with resourcing of the transformation process and its initiation, SSDDT assisted in development of the Transformation Implementation Plan.[68] In addition, the GoSS with the help of the UK “Security Sector Development and Defence Transformation (SSDDT) Programme in South Sudan” developed job descriptions for senior SPLA officers and began working on sectorial command structures.[69] Lastly, in April 2013, the National Security Committee held a workshop in order to identify the current challenges facing South Sudan’s national security.[70] 

The South Sudan DDR Commission is leading the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (NDDRP), which has been the main priority in the South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013 due to the overly large army.[71] The NDDRP consists of 3 month training that includes psychosocial support, reinsertion training, and vocational or entrepreneurship skills.[72] When training is completed, the participants are grouped into cooperatives in the field of their choice.[73] The last update on DDR was done on 12 August 2011, which estimated that around 12,525 soldiers have been demobilized - of which around 5,000 have been reintegrated. [74][75]

UNMISS has been actively working on transforming the SPLA into a professional force by combating the occurrence of child soldiers in the SPLA.[76] Indeed, in March 2012, two day training session was conducted by UNMISS for the SPLA to teach them about child rights provisions among other things – 35 SPLA soldiers underwent the training in  Mayom County, Unity State, 45 soldiers in Malakal, Upper Nile State and 60 soldiers in in Yei, Central Equatoria State.[77] Moreover, the SPLA and UN signed an “Action Plan Regarding Children Associated with the SPLA in South Sudan”, after which the SPLA formed Child Protection Units.[78]  However, since 2010 to April 2013, only 68 children have been demobilized and reunited with their families in Joglei State.[79]

UNMISS has provided other training workshops. In October 2013, 35 officers from 21 units of the SPLA attended a two day course on human rights that included “topics such as arbitrary arrest and detention, use of force, political freedoms, and accountability”.[80] In Malakal in May 2013, 15 of the SPLA officers attended a course that aimed to improve computer literacy by covering Microsoft Excel, PowerPoint and the Internet, which is ambitious considering that some of them did not even know how to turn on/off the computer.[81] In addition, UNMISS conducted a two day training course in Malakal for 15 high-ranking officers on “command responsibility and military justice” and the law of armed conflict, including sections on military necessity, discrimination and unnecessary suffering.”[82]

Other countries have been helping with DDR in South Sudan. For example, Netherlands programme was on “Enhancing Community Security through Ex-Combatant Employment”, which helped “cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families after they have been discharged from the military and to reduce the time gap between demobilization and reintegration.”[83] It started in January 2012 and lasted for five months, with the end result of a paid employment for 641 demobilized ex-combatants for 3 to 4 months.[84] In addition, the programme had other accomplishments: laid down the groundwork for positive relationships between the communities and the ex-combatants, improved agricultural production, reinforced work ethic, and helped zero in into new market opportunities.[85]

                Another external partner is Switzerland. It focused on building the capacity of the senior officers in South Sudan by supporting “career development and training on such topics as International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Law of Armed Conflicts (LOAC).”[86] Since 2009 the International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), on the request of the Swiss Federal Department of Defense, has reviewed and redesigned “the Swiss Programme of Support to SSR in South Sudan”, which now focuses on “the provision of strategic advice on the strategy/developmentof the Dr. Garang Memorial Military Academy (DGMMA) and “the review of the curricula in relation to IHL, democratic control and civil-military relations.”[87] In 2010, the Swiss Government began focusing more on the development of the DGMMA curriculum.[88]

Recommendations

           One of the biggest threats to internal security is the SPLA itself. The army is large, uneducated, and its soldiers have the mentality of guerrilla fighters. During the war, any willing and sometimes unwilling body, such as a child, is a “good” soldier. Since the country was in the state of war for two decades, most of the people are desperate, scared, and angry. Recruiting for the SPLA from the general public without any proper screening means that a lot of soldiers may have psychological issues caused by their harsh childhoods and lives. As a result, the SPLA soldiers could be responsible for a lot of human right abuses for that reason. Unfortunately, the UNMISS courses on human rights will not have an effect if the soldiers themselves do not have respect for human life.  In order to combat human rights abuses, the MoDVA should be put in charge of making the current SPLA soldiers go through psychological testing in order to make sure that they are fit for military duty. The psychological test should be included in the entrance exam for the Dr. Garang Memorial Military Academy or any other military academy in South Sudan. The ones that are deemed unfit should not be passed down to other security services, such the SPSS, since that will further internal insecurity.  The soldiers that are deemed unfit for duty should be included in DDR process. DDR will allow them to build a healthy relationship with the community. In addition, DDR will make ex-combatants contribute productively to their communities and provide disincentive to becoming a militia again.

                The testing should be done as a top to bottom approach, since the corrupted military officials could undermine the process by giving unsavoury orders to the soldiers. However, starting from the top will not be easily feasible since the SPLA has a great amount of power over politics, as demonstrated by its recent salary increase during harsh economic times. It should be kept in mind that any reduction in the SPLA forces is unlikely to be welcomed by the SPLA, since that would cut down its power. Consequently, the GoSS and the MoDVA need to appoint officials that would be dedicated to restructuring the SPLA by using the psychological testing and other means.

                The power and the expenses of the SPLA need to be curtailed. Allowing the SPLA to have more than 80 per cent of the defence budget, the MoDVA is not focusing on creating internal security that should be promoted by the SPSS. Lack of internal security creates unfavourable conditions for development that dooms the country to stay in its economically disastrous position, which invites external threats. Since the external threats allow the SPLA to maintain or to grow its current share of the defence budget, it would be in their interests to allow the continuation of external threats. Thus again it is imperative for the GoSS to ensure that the top level officials at the SPLA and the MoDVA are not corrupt. The fact that the DDR process has been hijacked and subverted by the SPLA commanders is a sign that some officials do not prioritize the interests of the country over the interests of the army.

                In addition, the SPLA needs to develop a new military strategy. The military tactic of attrition justifies the SPLA’s enormous size and cost, since in the war of attrition the victory is usually gained by those who have more resources. Naturally this type of warfare is not efficient, nor particularly effective. Snowden argued that a good strategy to deal with the insurgencies is operational art, which consists in outmanoeuvring the enemy in the cost-effective manner via “physical manoeuvre involving mobile forces in deep, close, rear, and reserve positions but, more importantly, psychological manoeuvre aimed at shattering an enemy’s cohesion and will to fight.”[89] In South Sudan’s case, this would involve “the removal of militia groups’ leadership, followed by rapid containment and use of responsive DDR approaches, offers an alternative strategy that embodies expressions of operational art.”[90] Luckily, since a lot of the SPLA soldiers have experience in guerrilla warfare, military tactic of raiding that is required to capture or to remove the militia’s leadership should already be familiar to them.

                Furthermore, inter-communal conflicts should deal with pre-emptively since they usually occur in certain areas during the dry season. However, since in such conflicts the interaction will be with civilians, any pre-emptive action should be done by trained SPSS, rather than the military. To that end, the SPSS needs to build up its capacity to be able to deal with such internal conflicts. In order to build up its capacity, more of the defence budget needs to be dedicated to the development of SPSS. On the other hand, border disputes have to be dealt with by the SPLA because they relate to the matters of external security. However, it is important for the GoSS to keep in mind that any military action done to address the border disputes will be pointless loss of life, because any long-lasting settlement of the border disputes will have to done politically via negotiation, compromise, and cooperation.

Lastly, there should be an internal coordination body for the SSR and DDR projects. Currently, the projects are done by the external and internal players on piecemeal bases without much coordination between them. A lack of coordination body plays to the GoSS advantage as doubling up on projects means more investment in the country. However, the lack of coherent strategy for restructuring SSR and DDR means that issues are dealt with on short-term basis. All of the UNMISS and external partners’ training courses of the SPLA effect small portion of the soldiers. They don’t have a systematic approach that would really change the SPLA in the long term. The coordination body could assess what has been done, notify the donors’ in which areas the training is most need, and advise how much resources and time should be devoted to those areas. For the external donors, the existence of this body will show the GoSS’s commitment to SSR and DDR, which will invite them to contribute further development projects.

---

[1] UN Refugee Agency, "Refugees in South Sudan,” United Nations, 30 June 2013, 30 June 2013 <http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/country.php?id=251>.

[2] SSDP 2011-2013 xiii

[3] Ibid

[4] Ibid

[5] Annual GDP growth in South Sudan, 10 July 2013, Raw data, The World Bank, n.p.

[6] BBC News, "Sudan 'orders Halt to Oil Transfers' from South Sudan," BBC, 08 June 2013, 16 July 2013.

[7] http://allafrica.com/stories/201307170715.html

[8] Media Monitoring Report, “Media Monitoring Report 2 July 2013," UNMISS, 2 July 2013, 3 July 2013 <http://www.unmiss.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3540>.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Peace and Security Council, “Report of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and South Sudan,” ADDIS ABABA: African Union, 2013, African Union Peace and Security, 13 Feb. 2013, 10 July 2013 <http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/report-of-the-african-union-high-level-implementation-panel-for-sudan-and-south-sudan-353rd-meeting-of-the-peace-and-security-council>.

[12] OECD, “Training Module on Security System Reform and Governance,” Development Assistance Committee Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (Paris: OECD, 2008): 11.

[13] Ibid. 163.

[14] United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, “The United Nation SSR Perspective,” The Security Sector Reform Unit, (DPKO 2012): 2.

[15] The Office of the Secretary-General, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in South Sudan,” United Nations UNMISS, 8 Mar. 2013, 10 July 2013: 5.

[16] Ibid. 6.

[17] UPI, "South Sudan Pursues Rebels in Jonglei," United Press International, 5 March 2013, 12 July 2013 <http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2013/03/05/South-Sudan-pursues-rebels-in-Jonglei/UPI-24971362490370/>.

[18] Gurtong Trust, "Jonglei Community Urges Government to Increase Number of SPLA Forces" 5 May 2013, 8 July 2013 <http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/11026/Jonglei-Community-Urges-Government-To-Increase-Number-of-SPLA-Forces.aspx>.

[19] Gurtong Trust,"Jonglei Community Urges Government to Increase Number of SPLA Forces" 5 May 2013, 8 July 2013 <http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/11026/Jonglei-Community-Urges-Government-To-Increase-Number-of-SPLA-Forces.aspx>.

[20] The Office of the Secretary-General, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in South Sudan,” United Nations UNMISS, 20 June 2013, 10 July 2013: 6.

[21] Radio Miraya, "Murle Community Plan to Meet Yau Yau over Peace," 22 May 2013, 10 July 2013. <http://www.radiomiraya.org/news-202/south-sudan/11308-murle-community-to-meet-yau-yau-over-peace.html>.

[22] Gurtong Trust, "Salva Kiir Reiterates Amnesty Call to David Yau Yau, Rebels," 3 July 2013, 7 July 2013 <http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/11839/Salva-Kiir-Reiterates-Amnesty-Call-To-David-Yau-Yau-Rebels.aspx>.

[23] http://www.voanews.com/content/south-sudan-yau-yau-peace-talks-murle-delegation/1685460.html

[24] The Office of the Secretary-General, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in South Sudan,” United Nations UNMISS, 8 March 2013, 10 July 2013: 6.

[25] Ibid 6

[26] Ibid 6

[27] Ibid 8

[28] Ibid 8

[29] Ibid 8

[30] Ibid 8

[31] The Office of the Secretary-General, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in South Sudan,” United Nations UNMISS, 20 June 2013, 10 July 2013: 6.

[32] Ibid 6

[33] The Office of the Secretary-General, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in South Sudan,” United Nations UNMISS, 20 June 2013, 10 July 2013: 5.

[34] John A., Snowden, Work in Progress: Security Force Development in South Sudan through February 2012. Working paper no. 27. (Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, 2012): 9.

[35] Voice of America, "South Sudan Reports Troop Invasion from North," Voice of America, 10 June 2013, 8 July 2013 <http://www.voanews.com/content/south-sudan-reports-troop-invasion-from-sudan/1678930.html>.

[36] AllAfrica.com, "Sudan: SAF Denies Juba Accusations of Fresh Attacks on Border Areas," Sudan Tribune, 6 July 2013, 10 July 2013 <http://allafrica.com/stories/201307070106.html>.

[37] John A., Snowden, Work in Progress: Security Force Development in South Sudan through February 2012. Working paper no. 27. (Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, 2012): 10.

[38] http://www.gurtong.net/Business/tabid/59/Default.aspx

[39] "UNISFA Background - United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei," UN News Center, 13 July 2013 <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unisfa/background.shtml>.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid.

[42] "Security Council Press Statement on Attack against United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei," UN News Center, 14 June 2013, 16 July 2013 <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc11034.doc.htm>.

[43] The Cooperation Agreement between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of the South Sudan, n.p., 27 Sept. 2012, 6 July 2013 <http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/files/2012/09/The-Cooperation-Agreement-Between-Sudan-and-South-Sudan0001.pdf> 4.

[44] SPECIAL REPORT Abyei Food Security Assessment, Famine Early Warning System Network, April 2013, 8 July 2013: 1.

[45] "UNISFA Background - United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei," UN News Center, 13 July 2013 <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unisfa/background.shtml>.

[46] "Rule of Law and Security Institutions Support," UNMISS, United Nations, 16 July 2013 <http://unmiss.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=4056>.

[47] United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, “The United Nation SSR Perspective,” The Security Sector Reform Unit, (DPKO 2012): 42.

[48] South Sudan, Rep., Human Rights Watch, January 2013, 8 July 2013 <http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/south-sudan> 3.

[49] Andrew Green, "South Sudan's Red Army Comes of Age," The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 27 March 2013, 6 July 2013 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2013/mar/27/south-sudan-red-army-comes-age>.

[50] "DDR Digest," UNDP 2.12 (2011): 2, 6 July 2013 <http://www.ssddrc.org/uploads/Publication%20Documents/DDR%20Digest%202011,%20Vol%202,%20Issue%203-3.pdf>

[51] Abraham Sewonet Abatneh and Simon Monoja Lubang, “Police reform and

state formation in Southern Sudan,” Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne

d'études du développement, 32:1 (2011): 95.

[52] "Security Sector Reform Resource Centre," Security Sector Reform Resource Centre RSS, 11 December 2013, 16 July 2013 <http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2012/12/11/situation-report-ssr-and-ddr-in-the-sudans/>.

[53] "Inside DDR: Your Trusted Informer," South Sudan DDR Commission, (Dec. 2011): 2, 6 July 2013 <www.ssddrc.org/uploads/DDR%20Inside/DDR%20Inside%20-%20December%202011-u.pdf>.

[54] "The Road Ahead: Challenges and Opportunities of SSR 2013," Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, International Security Sector Advisory Team (2013): 43, 16 July 2013. <http://issat.dcaf.ch/Community-of-Practice/Resource-Library/Policy-and-Research-Papers/The-Road-Ahead-Challenges-and-Opportunities-of-SSR-2013>. 43

[55] "National Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (NDDRC)," GoSS, 14 July 2013 <http://www.goss-online.org/magnoliaPublic/en/Independant-Commissions-and-Chambers/Demobilization--Disarmament-and-Reintegration.html>.

[56] Abraham Sewonet Abatneh and Simon Monoja Lubang, “Police reform and

state formation in Southern Sudan,” Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne

d'études du développement, 32:1 (2011): 95.

[57] John A., Snowden, Work in Progress: Security Force Development in South Sudan through February 2012. Working paper no. 27. (Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, 2012): 24.

[58] Ibid. 24.

[59] HSBA. Failures and Opportunities: Rethinking DDR in South Sudan. Issue brief no. 17. (Small Arms Survey, May 2011) : 3.

[60] Ibid. 3.

[61] John A., Snowden, Work in Progress: Security Force Development in South Sudan through February 2012. Working paper no. 27. (Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, 2012): 19.

[62] Ibid.

[63] John A., Snowden, Work in Progress: Security Force Development in South Sudan through February 2012. Working paper no. 27. (Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, 2012): 20.

[64] "Defence and Veterans Affairs," GoSS, 12 July 2013 <http://www.goss-online.org/magnoliaPublic/en/ministries/splaaffairs.html>.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Annual Review Security Sector Development & Defence Transformation. Rep. no. 200329. UK Department of International Development., (16-27 July 2012): 7, 10 July 2013. <http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Project=200329> .

[67] Ibid. 8.

[68] Ibid. 8.

[69] Ibid. 8.

[70] Gurtong Trust, "National Drafting Committee for Security Policy Working in Wau," Gurtong Trust, 13 April2013, 16 July 2013 <http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/10667/National-Drafting-Committee-For-Security-Policy-Working-In-Wau.aspx>.

[71] "National DDR Programme Updates," South Sudan DDR Commission, 16 July 2013 <http://www.ssddrc.org/informing-communities/other-resources/national-ddr-programme-updates.html>.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid.

[74] "DDR Digest," UNDP 2.12 (2011): 1, 6 July 2013 <http://www.ssddrc.org/uploads/Publication%20Documents/DDR%20Digest%202011,%20Vol%202,%20Issue%203-3.pdf>.

[75] South Sudan, Government of the Republic of South, Sudan South Sudan Development Plan 2011 -2013, (Juba: GoSS, 2011): 108.

[76] "DDR Digest," UNDP 2.12 (2011): 2, 6 July 2013 <http://www.ssddrc.org/uploads/Publication%20Documents/DDR%20Digest%202011,%20Vol%202,%20Issue%203-3.pdf>.

[77] "UNMISS Trains SPLA in Child Protection," UNMISS, 20 March 2013, 16 July 2013. <http://unmiss.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details>.

[78] Ibid.

[79] "SPLA Soldiers in Jonglei Trained on Child Protection," ReliefWeb, 17 Apr. 2013, 10 July 2013 <http://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan-republic/spla-soldiers-jonglei-trained-child-protection>.

[80] "UNMISS Trains Aweil SPLA Officers in Human Rights," UNMISS, United Nations, 30 October 2012, 16 July 2013. <http://unmiss.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details>.

[81] "UNMISS Trains SPLA in Computers in Malakal," UNMISS, 6 May 2013, 16 July 2013. <http://unmiss.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details>.

[82] Ibid.

[83] "Enhancing Community Security through Ex-Combatant Employment," DCAF ISSAT, 16 July 2013, <http://issat.dcaf.ch/Community-of-Practice/SSR-in-Practice/Countries-Regions/South-Sudan-The-Republic-of/Enhancing-Community-Security-through-Ex-Combatant-Employment>.

[84] Ibid.

[85] Ibid.

[86] "South Sudan, The Republic of," DCAF ISSAT, 16 July 2013 <http://issat.dcaf.ch/Community-of-Practice/SSR-in-Practice/Countries-Regions/South-Sudan-The-Republic-of>.

[87] "Swiss SSR Programme in Support to the Government of South Sudan," DCAF ISSAT, 16 July 2013 <http://issat.dcaf.ch/Community-of-Practice/SSR-in-Practice/Countries-Regions/South-Sudan-The-Republic-of/Swiss-SSR-programme-in-support-to-the-Government-of-South-Sudan>.

[88] Ibid.

[89] John A., Snowden, Work in Progress: Security Force Development in South Sudan through February 2012. Working paper no. 27. (Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, 2012): 24

[90] John A., Snowden, Work in Progress: Security Force Development in South Sudan through February 2012. Working paper no. 27. (Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, 2012):25

Works Cited

Annual GDP growth in South Sudan. 10 July 2013. Raw data. The World Bank, n.p.

Annual Review Security Sector Development & Defence Transformation. Rep. no. 200329. UK Department of International Dvelopment., 16-27 July 2012. Web. 10 July 2013. <http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Project=200329>.

"Business." Gurtong. Gurtong Trust. 24 July 2013 <http://www.gurtong.net/Business/tabid/59/Default.aspx>.

"DDR Digest." UNDP 2.12 (2011): 1-3. Web. 6 July 2013. <http://www.ssddrc.org/uploads/Publication%20Documents/DDR%20Digest%202011,%20Vol%202,%20Issue%203-3.pdf>.

"Defence and Veterans Affairs." GoSS. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 July 2013. <http://www.goss-online.org/magnoliaPublic/en/ministries/splaaffairs.html>.

"Enhancing Community Security through Ex-Combatant Employment." DCAF ISSAT. N.p., n.d. Web. 16 July 2013. <http://issat.dcaf.ch/Community-of-Practice/SSR-in-Practice/Countries-Regions/South-Sudan-The-Republic-of/Enhancing-Community-Security-through-Ex-Combatant-Employment>.

Green, Andrew. "South Sudan's Red Army Comes of Age." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 27 Mar. 2013. Web. 6 July 2013. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2013/mar/27/south-sudan-red-army-comes-age>.

HSBA. Failures and Opportunities: Rethinking DDR in South Sudan. Issue brief no. 17. Small Arms Survey, May 2011. Web. 10 July 2013.

"IMF Survey: South Sudan Faces Hurdles as World's Newest Country." International Monetary FUnd. N.p., 18 July 2011. Web. 16 July 2013. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2011/car071811a.htm>.

"Inside DDR : Your Trusted Informer." South Sudan DDR Commission. N.p., Dec. 2011. Web. 6 July 2013. <www.ssddrc.org/uploads/DDR%20Inside/DDR%20Inside%20-%20December%202011-u.pdf>.

"Jonglei Community Urges Government To Increase Number of SPLA Forces." Gurtong. N.p., 5 May 2013. Web. 8 July 2013. <http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/11026/Jonglei-Community-Urges-Government-To-Increase-Number-of-SPLA-Forces.aspx>.

Mayar, Manyang David. "Yau Yau Ready for Peace Talks: Murle Delegation." VOA 19 June 2013. 24 July 2013 <http://www.voanews.com/content/south-sudan-yau-yau-peace-talks-murle-delegation/1685460.html>. 

"Media Monitoring Report." Media Monitoring Report. UNMISS, 2 July 2013. Web. 3 July 2013. <http://www.unmiss.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3540>.

"Murle Community Plan to Meet Yau Yau over Peace." Radio Miraya. N.p., 22 May 2013. Web. 10 July 2013. <http://www.radiomiraya.org/news-202/south-sudan/11308-murle-community-to-meet-yau-yau-over-peace.html>.

"National DDR Programme Updates." South Sudan DDR Commission. N.p., n.d. Web. 16 July 2013. <http://www.ssddrc.org/informing-communities/other-resources/national-ddr-programme-updates.html>.

"National Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (NDDRC)." GoSS. N.p., n.d. Web. 14 July 2013. <http://www.goss-online.org/magnoliaPublic/en/Independant-Commissions-and-Chambers/Demobilization--Disarmament-and-Reintegration.html>.

"National Drafting Committee For Security Policy Working In Wau." Gurtong Trust. N.p., 13 Apr. 2013. Web. 16 July 2013. <http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/10667/National-Drafting-Committee-For-Security-Policy-Working-In-Wau.aspx>.

OECD. Development Assistance Committee Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation. Training Module on Security System Reform and Governance. Paris: OECD, 2008. Print.

"Refugees in South Sudan." UN Refugee Agency. United Nations, 30 June 2013. Web. 30 June 2013. <http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/country.php?id=251>.

"The Road Ahead: Challenges and Opportunities of SSR 2013." Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. International Security Sector Advisory Team, 2013. Web. 16 July 2013. <http://issat.dcaf.ch/Community-of-Practice/Resource-Library/Policy-and-Research-Papers/The-Road-Ahead-Challenges-and-Opportunities-of-SSR-2013>.

"Rule of Law and Security Institutions Support." UNMISS. United Nations, n.d. Web. 16 July 2013. <http://unmiss.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=4056>.

"Salva Kiir Reiterates Amnesty Call To David Yau Yau, Rebels." Gurtong Trust. N.p., 3 July 2013. Web. 7 July 2013. <http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/11839/Salva-Kiir-Reiterates-Amnesty-Call-To-David-Yau-Yau-Rebels.aspx>.

"Security Council Press Statement on Attack against United NationsInterim Security Force for Abyei." UN News Center. UN, 14 June 2013. Web. 16 July 2013. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc11034.doc.htm>.

"Security Sector Reform Resource Centre." Security Sector Reform Resource Centre RSS. N.p., 11 Dec. 2013. Web. 16 July 2013. <http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2012/12/11/situation-report-ssr-and-ddr-in-the-sudans/>.

Snowden, John A. Work in Progress: Security Force Development in South Sudan through February 2012. Working paper no. 27. Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, 2012. Print.

South Sudan and Sudan. The Cooperation Agreement between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of the South Sudan. N.p., 27 Sept. 2012. Web. 6 July 2013. <http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/files/2012/09/The-Cooperation-Agreement-Between-Sudan-and-South-Sudan0001.pdf>.

South Sudan Development Plan 2011 -2013. Rep. Juba: The GoSS, 2011.

South Sudan. Government of the Republic of South Sudan. South Sudan Development Plan 2011 -2013. Juba: n.p., 2011. Print.

South Sudan. Peace and Security Council. REPORT OF THE AFRICAN UNION HIGH-LEVEL IMPLEMENTATION PANEL FOR SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN. ADDIS ABABA: African Union, 2013. African Union Peace and Security. African Union, 13 Feb. 2013. Web. 10 July 2013. <http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/report-of-the-african-union-high-level-implementation-panel-for-sudan-and-south-sudan-353rd-meeting-of-the-peace-and-security-council>.

"South Sudan Pursues Rebels in Jonglei." UPI. United Press International, 5 Mar. 2013. Web. 12 July 2013. <http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2013/03/05/South-Sudan-pursues-rebels-in-Jonglei/UPI-24971362490370/>.

South Sudan. Rep. Human Rights Watch, Jan. 2013. Web. 8 July 2013. <http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/south-sudan>.

"South Sudan Reports Troop Invasion from North." Voice of America. N.p., 10 June 2013. Web. 8 July 2013. <http://www.voanews.com/content/south-sudan-reports-troop-invasion-from-sudan/1678930.html>.

South Sudan. South Sudan Development Plan 2011 -2013. Juba: Juba, 2011. Print.

"South Sudan, The Republic of." DCAF ISSAT. N.p., n.d. Web. 16 July 2013. <http://issat.dcaf.ch/Community-of-Practice/SSR-in-Practice/Countries-Regions/South-Sudan-The-Republic-of>.

SPECIAL REPORT Abyei Food Security Assessment. Rep. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Famine Early Warning System Network, Apr. 2013. Web. 8 July 2013.

"SPLA Soldiers in Jonglei Trained on Child Protection." ReliefWeb. N.p., 17 Apr. 2013. Web. 10 July 2013. <http://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan-republic/spla-soldiers-jonglei-trained-child-protection>.

"Sudan 'orders Halt to Oil Transfers' from South Sudan." BBC News. BBC, 08 June 2013. Web. 16 July 2013.

"Sudan: SAF Denies Juba Accusations of Fresh Attacks On Border Areas." AllAfrica.com. Sudan Tribune, 6 July 2013. Web. 10 July 2013. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201307070106.html>.

"Sudan Urges Juba to Cease Backing Rebels Before Stopping Oil Flow." AllAfrica.com 17 July 2013. Sudan Tribune. 24 July 2013 <http://allafrica.com/stories/201307170715.html>.

"Sudan/South Sudan Consultations : What's In Blue." Whatsinblue.org. 23 July 2013. Security Council. 25 July 2013 <http://www.whatsinblue.org/2013/07/sudansouth-sudan-consultations-3.php>.

"Swiss SSR Programme in Support to the Government of South Sudan." DCAF ISSAT. N.p., n.d. Web. 16 July 2013. <http://issat.dcaf.ch/Community-of-Practice/SSR-in-Practice/Countries-Regions/South-Sudan-The-Republic-of/Swiss-SSR-programme-in-support-to-the-Government-of-South-Sudan>.

"UNISFA Background - United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei." UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web. 13 July 2013. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unisfa/background.shtml>.

United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions. The United Nation SSR Perspective. N.p.: DPKO Security Sector Reform Unit, 2012. Print.

United Nations. The Office of the Secretary-General. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. N.p.: n.p., n.d. United Nations. UNMISS, 8 Mar. 2013. Web. 10 July 2013. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmiss/reports.shtml>.

"UNMISS Trains Aweil SPLA Officers in Human Rights." UNMISS. United Nations, 30 Oct. 2012. Web. 16 July 2013. <http://unmiss.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details>.

"UNMISS Trains SPLA in Child Protection." UNMISS. N.p., 20 Mar. 2013. Web. 16 July 2013. <http://unmiss.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details>.

"UNMISS Trains SPLA in Computers in Malakal." UNMISS. N.p., 6 May 2013. Web. 16 July 2013. <http://unmiss.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details>.