Thursday, December 13, 2012

Thoughts on Humanitarian Intervention



The civil conflict in Syria has been highly televised and commented on. The cases for and against intervention have been made by Security Council members, who are very much divided on this issue. This post shall examine the cases for and against humanitarian intervention, in light of the following literature:  Micheal Walzer’s article “The Argument about Humanitarian Intervention”, Micheal Ignatieff’s article “Intervention and State Failure” and Stephen Wertheim’s article “When Humanitarianism Hurts”. After examination of the cases for and against intervention, it will be concluded that international community should (not must) intervene when it believes the outcome of intervention will be positive.
Walzer argues that when it comes to problems international arena, there is “a radical break, a chasm, with nastiness on one side and genocide on the other”. We should intervene when there is a case of genocide or ethnic cleansing. However, we should not intervene to correct “the common brutalities of authoritarian politics”, because in these cases the social change will be best achieved from within. Otherwise, it is likely that the intervention might do more harm than good.  Similarly, Wertheim argues that intervention is only morally permissible when it is actually feasible. If we have enough resources to intervene, before we do so “we must imagine the plausible and probable consequences and plan realistically and far-sightedly”.  He argues that if it is concluded that intervention might do more harm than good, then we must not intervene. Indeed, we can intervene for our benefit rather than the benefit of the victims. For instance, the attempt of intervention makes the interveners feel better about ourselves: they did something to stop the atrocity. However, disregard for consequences of the intervention puts the intervener’s need to be morally blameless above the victims’ actual well-being. Ignatieff has touched on this point in his article. He noted that people in poor countries believe that intervention by the West is often “a lurid exercise in emotional self-gratification” lacking the needed focus on post-reconstruction of conflict area. He highlights that we have “responsibility to follow through”. Once we commit to intervening in conflict, we must provide “sustained follow up”. Thus in the case of Syria, the international community should not intervene without a clear plan for intervention and post-conflict reconstruction and  the strong conviction that the end result would do more good than harm.  Moreover, since the level of violence has not yet reached the level of genocide, it is difficult to claim definitively that military intervention will do more good than harm, in short and/or long term. It is still possible that that fruitful social change can still come from within the country, which would produce better and more long lasting results than any change imposed from outside.
However, international actors should intervene in Syria when the violence and human rights violations reach the level of genocide. If the government begins using chemical weapons, vast amounts of people will be killed which would escalate the current level of violence to the level of genocide. Walzer claims that we have not only a right to act, but an obligation to intervene in this case. If there are risks involved for the intervening state than international actors have a right to respond if they wish, but they are not morally bound to respond. However, he claims that international states have an obligation to intervene, rather than a right, because “the survival of intervening state is not at risk.” Examining the motives of intervening states, he concludes that the intervention is acceptable if intervening state has self-interest in intervening because then it is more likely to actually intervene to stop atrocities. In fact, he argues that “the leaders of states have a right, indeed, they have an obligation, to consider the interests of their own people, even when they are acting to help other people.” However, it could be argued that this statement challenges his earlier claim that states have an obligation to intervene because their survival is not at risk. If he concedes that states have an obligation to consider the interests of their own people when they decided on helping others, then it is possible that the two obligations could be in conflict. Unless there is massive support (majority) for intervention by the citizens of intervening states, then it is possible that intervening states are disregarding their obligation to their citizens. Moreover, solders are duty bound to act in the interest of the security (or in other interest) of their nation. They take an oath to protect their nation. It is morally questionable to require a soldier to be involved in a military confrontation from which his state does not benefit. Perhaps it would be “the right thing to do” for that a state to intervene, but it is possible that it is not morally obligated to do so when the majority of its citizens are not in full support of the intervention. The state has a duty to use its soldiers only for the benefit of the state because those soldiers signed up to protect the state, not the world, and act in the benefit of the state, not in the benefit of the helpless everywhere.
Perhaps it is best to leave the intervention as a right rather than an obligation. If the international community has an obligation to intervene, on top of that it has an obligation to succeed in its intervention and on top of that it has an obligation to provide “sustained follow up”; then the result would be either no one would intervene or almost everyone would “fail”. Thus international community should intervene in Syria only when there is no hope for successful change to come from within the country. In addition, international community should (not must) believe it can stop the conflict successfully and leave the country in better state than it found it in. The decision to intervene should be well thought through, because no victim will say “well, thanks for trying!” when you made their living conditions a lot worse rather than better.



Peacebuilding in Libya

This is an excerpt from an essay I have wrote for one of my classes.  I shall put up the whole essay in a month or so, but this is the most important part of the essay.  This expert examines the peace operations in Libya. .. If anything does not make sense, you are probably lacking context so read the full essay when it's up :p .
 Libya is an interesting case because it is often hailed as a successful peace operation in the media. As you will see below, I agree with this point even though there are still a lot of uncertainties when it comes to Libya's case. P.S. I'll fix the footnotes in a week or so :P And sorry... this is going to be very dry, but in my defense it's an excerpt from an essay and its very hard to make academic writing fun :P .


Image taken from UNSMIL website
The Case of Libya



Peacebuilding

National Transitional Council has been established and recognized as legitimate government by 30 countries even before the end of the war.  Following the declaration of liberation in October 2011, NTC organized a national election of General National Congress on July 7th, 2012. In October 2012, the GNC elected Ali Zeidan who became the country’s Prime Minister in charge of creating transition coalition government.[1] He chose his government representatives from two biggest blocs in the Congress the Alliance of National Forces, led and the Muslim Brotherhood's Justice and Construction Party. [2] In addition, the GNC will create “constitutional assembly to draft a new constitution which will be submitted to a referendum in 2013.”[3]
Although there have been protests about the make-up of the cabinet, they should be viewed as an acceptable form of voicing ones discontent with political or social issues. The reconstruction of the Libyan political system has been largely positive. Indeed, it met three of the aforementioned requirements of the peacebuilding process: transitional government, elections and elected government. Moreover, there is a lot of internal political support in favour of current political change. For example, the Benghazi part of the February 17th Coalition, which was part of revolution from the first protest, has decided to dissolve because of “their desire to submit to a single legitimate authority which the NTC represented”.[4] The Coalition refuses to take position of “revolutionary command council”, because they believe that “resort to ‘revolutionary legitimacy’ [might threaten] stability and democratic transformation.”[5] In addition, the Libyan Brotherhood has expressed their support for civil state, democracy or ‘moderate’ Islamic state and civil society. [6] Even the some of the radicals are supporting the regime change. The leader of the Libyan Fighting Group, Bilhaj, has expressed “on numerous political occasions and media appearances his commitment to the establishment of a democratic state, he has recently announced the establishment of the Islamic Movement for Change” that has publicly defended the national political agenda.[7]
 However, it should be noted that security sector reform component of peacebuilding is still incomplete. The NTC had issues imposing its political will because it lacks legitimacy, and therefore it is unable to back its will by force.[8] This will likely change with the newly elected government, but it is too early to say so definitively. Similarly, institutional reform in army, police and judicial sectors in order to achieve “a functioning law enforcement apparatus” has not been yet been achieved for the same reason.
The key issue in security sector is the militias. The local councils that are in charge of administrating cities have military components to them but they do not have full control of those components.[9]  Thus militias are controlling the streets, while not under the control of the government. Indeed, militias never combined into one united force during, or after the conflict, and are now ruling over their own sections of territory thus undermining the authority of the elected government.[10] In addition, the previously mentioned Islamic Movement for Change “has been busy arming itself and forming loyal armed brigades”, while giving a supporting political rhetoric in favour of the regime.[11] Indeed, the security sector disorder has manifested itself in the attack on the US embassy in September, with a result of 4 deaths - one of which was the US ambassador. However, there is hope that with time the elected government will acquire more power and will be able to get the security sector under its control. Indeed, the Libyan people are tired of fighting and want security, which has been demonstrated by the revolt against militias in response to attacks on US embassy.[12] This has given the government the opportunity to “take more concentrated action to consolidate military forces under its command.”[13] One of the ways suggested of reintegrating militias into society is with “a combination of financial rewards, promise of adequate social standing, and above all, assurances that laying down their arms will not jeopardize their safety or that of their community.”[14] However, this can only be done by the elected legitimate government. Indeed, even though there is also still a lot of peacebuilding to be done in economic development, social rehabilitation and regulatory reform, it should be done by the elected government rather than outside forces or foreign diplomats. Otherwise, the process will not to be deemed legitimate and acceptable by the local people.
Currently, UN peacebuilding mission is headed by UN Support Mission in Libya that was created in order to “assist the Libyan authorities to define national needs and priorities throughout Libya, and to match these with offers of strategic and technical advice where appropriate.”[15] It is meant to provide support in the following areas: democratic transition, Rule of Law & Human Right, Security Sector Reform, International Assistance Coordination and countering of illicit proliferation of arms. If UNSMIL follows its mandate closely, then it will be a positive force in Libya. However, it must be careful not to highjack the transition and state-building process from the Libyan people and government in order to install the Western values. If the Libyan people believe that changes in their political system are coming from outside, then they will be less likely to trust it and more likely to rebel against it.


[1] World Bank, Libya Overview, Sep. 2012, 10 Dec.2012 <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/libya/overview>.
[2] BBC News, Libyan Parliament Approves New Government, 13 Oct.2012, 10 Dec.2012 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20152538>.
[3] World Bank, Libya Overview, Sep. 2012, 10 Dec.2012, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/libya/overview>.
[4] Ibid. 17.
[5] Ibid. 17.
[6] Ibid. 17.
[7] Ibid. 19.
[8] Youssef Mohammad Sawani, “Post-Qadhafi Libya: Interactive Dynamics and the Political Future,” Contemporary Arab Affairs, 5:1 (2012): 9.
[9] Ibid. 16.
[10] Christopher S. Chivvis, Keith Crane, Peter Mandaville, Jeffrey Martini, “Libya’s Post- Qaddafi Transition: The Nation-Building Challenge,” RAND Corporation (2012): 4.
[11] Ibid. 19.
[12] Ibid. 3.
[13] Ibid. 5.
[14] Ibid. 6.
[15] UNSMIL, UNSMIL Mandate, 10 Dec.2012 <http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3544&language=en-US>.