Starting in 2001 as part of an anti-terrorism campaign, the war in
Afghanistan became the focal point for the War on Terror. The conflict began after 9/11, when
Afghanistan refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden without solid proof of his
participation in the planning of the attack. Shortly after, in October 2001, Operation
Enduring Freedom began, to which Canada contributed its Joint Task Force 2. Even
though the regular Canadian Forces arrived in Afghanistan a few months later, Canada’s
main contribution to the war did not commence until 2006. At this time,
Canadian troops were redeployed to Kandahar province in order to replace the American
provincial reconstruction team (PRT).[1]
Canadian participation in such a dangerous area signaled a major shift in
Canadian involvement. Thus Canada was clearly demanding additional
responsibility in the Afghanistan war.
However, the explanation for increasing Canada’s military participation
in Afghanistan is not as obvious. In fact, it is quite puzzling if one takes
into account that by 2008 most Canadians were against it.[2]
In December 2010, an Angus-Reid poll showed that 56% of Canadians opposed the
military operation involving Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan, which is an increase
of 7% since February 2010. [3][4]
In addition, this war is costly in
financial terms and in loss of life. However, consecutive Canadian governments
have decided not only to participate in the war in Afghanistan, but to do so
actively and with growing responsibilities. This essay will explore two factors from the
different theoretical approaches, neoclassical realism and constructivism, in
an effort to explain Canada’s significant engagement in Afghanistan. It will argue that the neoclassic realist explanation
- the augmentation of Canada’s prestige and influence in the eyes of its
superpower neighbour and the world - is a lot stronger than the constructivist
explanation: Canada was acting in accordance with its identity as an advocate
for democracy and a “helpful fixer.”[5]
In order to understand Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan, one needs to
fully understand the context for this war.
Prior to its engagement in Afghanistan, Canada has not been a very
strong player in NATO mainly due to its small military force.[6]
Although Canada was not publicly criticized for this shortcoming, it was
definitely made aware of it during the annual NATO performance reviews or
during summits.[7] The
day after 9/11, there was a “call to arms” by the secretary general of NATO,
Lord Robertson, who said that: “the Alliance had invoked Article 5 of the
Atlantic Charter,” which meant that attack on one state is considered as an
attack on all the members.[8]
Thus Prime Minister Chretien committed
Canada to tracking down al Qaeda terrorists and aid America in its “War on
Terror.”[9]
However, Canadian realities have drawn limits on those commitments. First
of all, the separatist Parti Quebecois was attempting to use the Quebecois’ opposition
to involvement in Afghanistan to boost its popularity.[10]
Chretien could not allow this. Secondly, anti-Americanism sentiment stemmed
largely from disapproval of the Bush Administration, which opposed foreign
policy initiatives that were popular with Canadians.[11]
These two realities made it unthinkable for the Canadian government to follow the
USA into Iraq. Thus Canada needed to prove to America that it still was a good
ally even if they were having disagreements. In order to achieve this goal, Prime
Minister Martin re-committed the Canadian military to Afghanistan in 2005. This
commitment was fully embraced by the Harper government in 2006. Indeed, it is under Harper’s government that
the commitment to Afghanistan grew even though it was to dismay of majority of
Canadians.
The first approach through the lens of which we will examine Canada’s
significant engagement is neoclassical realism. A neoclassical realist could
argue that Canada’s desire for the augmentation of influence and prestige in
the eyes of its superpower neighbour explains Canada’s significant engagement
in Afghanistan. This argument embodies two tenants from neoclassical realism.
First, neoclassical realists believe that: “… the relationship between international
actors is primarily one of power. Nevertheless, it is a relational and relative
concept, which depends on the evaluation of the leadership of a state on their
capacity (especially material) to impose their positions and objectives with
respect to other international actors.”[12]
Second, they believe that “leadership’s perception of the relative power of
their state and [leadership’s perception of] the internal fundamental factors
contribute to development of their foreign policy.”[13]
For a neoclassical realist, power -
as a relational and relative concept – explains why Canada’s foreign policy initiatives
are so intertwined with US wants or demands. If Canada does not act in
accordance with the US’s desires, it will suffer the consequences of its
dissent. For example, after the decision
not to follow the US into Iraq was publically announced, Bush’s “long-planned
visit” to address the Parliament was cancelled, and Bush hosted at his home the
Australian PM, who supported the decision to go to war. [14]
Thus there was a reason for the Canadian government to mend and then uphold
amicable relations with the USA. As McDonough points out: “the danger that the US would unilaterally
redefine the character of [the existing] security relationship necessitates a
renewed Canadian emphasis on domestic and continental security measures.”[15] Consequently,
Canada found itself in the position where it had 3 goals: appease the USA,
increase its influence and increase its hard military power.
Through its commitment to
Afghanistan, Canada has succeeded in all of the above. The Harper government has increased funding
to the Canadian military to the point that Canada was able to commit 2500
personnel to Afghanistan. It was the third largest combat force on the ground. Although 2500 was a modest number when
compared to other contributing nations to the War on Terror, its contributions
were qualitative and placed Canada in high ranks as an ally.[16]
Canada was rising in the eyes of its neighbouring hegemon even with its commencing
initiatives in Afghanistan. It inherited the command of American warships and
the “force protection duties for US amphibious forces”. In addition, its
commodore was elevated to the commander of task force 151 which was
unprecedented in combat. [17]
In 2006, Canadians troops were redeployed to the dangerous area of Kandahar in
order to replace the American PRT. Thus Canada was clearly acting in its desire
to increase prestige by acquiring more responsibility for the Canadian Forces. This
explains why even after the public support for the war has largely recoiled, the
Canadian government continued its engagement in Afghanistan.
On the other hand, there is a lot of weight to the
constructivist argument that Canada was acting in accordance with its identity/role
as an advocate for democracy (since it was the official justification of the
government.) This argument is based on one of the key concepts of
constructivism, which is identity: “a particular form of existence of different
agents – comprised of defining and continuous process, by the agents
themselves, in a triple collective image: of the self, of the self in relation with
its environment and of the difference between the self and the other agents.”[18]
As per Wendt, identity is interlinked with the role the actor prescribes to
itself and both are perpetuated via continuous actions or process.[19]
The role or the identity of a state in the international
system is very important. The reasons are nicely summed up by Peter van Ham: “having
a bad reputation or none at all is a serious handicap for a state seeking to
remain competitive in the international arena. The unbranded state has a
difficult time attracting economic and political attention. Image and
reputation are thus becoming essential parts of the state’s strategic equity”.[20]
Therefore, in order to remain competitive, Canada must uphold its identity by
continuing to play its role as a peacekeeping, liberal, humanitarian,
democratic, and democracy advocating nation. This point, promotion of a
stronger Canadian identity and role in international system, has even been
identified by a 2005 International Policy Statement (IPS). [21]
As a result, Canada has carved out a special
role in Afghanistan that is in accordance with its identity as an advocate of
democracy. In Kabul, Canada’s mission was “designed to disrupt terrorist cells
trying to interfere with the electoral and political processes, while at the
same time facilitating these processes.”[22] As part of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF), Canada had a mandate to support Karzai’s government
and “establish stability and governmental authority throughout the country.”[23]
Moreover, Canada was the main contributor to the promotion of state-building in
Afghanistan via its strategic advisory team Afghanistan (SAT-A), a small 15 man
CF unit. Under this mission, Operation
Argus, the team assisted the Karzai government on “issues of governance and
state-building, with particular emphasis on capacity building and the
development of Afghan national development strategy (ANDS).”[24]
This specific goal, championed by Canada, has resonance with the 2005 IPS which
concluded that: “The Government of Canada’s efforts [should] be directed at
solving specific problems.”[25]
Thus Canada’s actions in Afghanistan mirror the self-perception of its role in the
world.
For the neoclassical
realist and the constructivist arguments that are proposed above, the point of
convergence is perception. For constructivists, the participation of Canada in
Afghanistan has been in accordance with its perception of its current identity
as an advocate of democracy and as a helpful fixer. While for neoclassical
realists, the focus is on Canada’s need for a stronger position in the
international system, as perceived by it and by other states. As a result, the
two explanations are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, they are quite complementary:
Canada is acting in accordance with the view of its current identity, while at
the same time it is promoting and searching for a stronger role in
international affairs.
However,
while there is a similarity between the explanations, it does not mean that the
two are equal in their force. While neither explanation is constitutive, the neoclassical
realist’s explanation is necessary and sufficient for understanding Canada’s
significant engagement in Afghanistan, whereas the constructivist’s explanation
is just necessary. The neoclassical realist argument – Canada is acting in its desire
to increase its prestige – would by itself explain the reason for Canada’s
significant engagement, because it accounts for the degree of the engagement (i.e.
significant), not just the fact that Canada participated in the war in
Afghanistan. Thus it is a necessary and
sufficient explanation. In contrast, the
constructivist’s “identity” argument can be viewed as necessary, but not
sufficient, because by itself it cannot fully account for the phenomenon. In
other words, it is necessary in understanding Canada’s engagement, but by
itself it does not completely explain the whole phenomenon, i.e., it does not
explain the degree of Canada’s
engagement.
One could foresee the opposing argument to the neoclassical
realist explanation that the Canadian government was comfortable with the
amount of influence and prestige it had in the international sphere, or that it
did not consider that increasing them was an important goal for the government
at this time. However, the 2005 International Policy Statement did say that
Canada needed to increase its influence in the world, especially vis-à-vis the United
States. Indeed, the IPS said, “We will set our own course and pull our own
weight”, which meant to encourage a foreign policy different to that of United
States. [26] Thus
increased influence was a recognised and important aim for Canadian government.
There are many alternative explanations for Canada’s
engagement. Liberalists cite human security, responsibility to protect and
multilateralism as possible explanations.[27]
On the other hand, realists are much less optimistic about the benevolence of
Canada’s intentions. Taking into the consideration the shock, fear, anger, and
distress of Canadians and Americans after 9/11, it is not a large leap to the
thought of retaliation or self-defence. These thoughts are in agreement with
the reasoning of realists. Realists believe that security is the predominant
preoccupation of states; the states will do everything to assure their security
against the aggression of other states and ensure their own survival.[28]
Indeed, the justifications given by the US government and NATO for military
invention in Afghanistan were consistent with this realist logic. When
appealing to the Security Council to obtain legitimate approval for the
intervention, the US only made arguments for self-defense. However, later when
they could not find al –Qaeda, NATO had to find a new justification for the continuing
presence in Afghanistan. These new justifications were humanitarian
intervention and state-building.[29]
However, as realists would like to point out, the initial and “true” reason for
US and Canada’s intervention was self-defence to 9/11.
McDonough explains best the reason for the Canadian
solidarity with the USA. Canada does not see itself as immune to attacks by
terrorists, because it saw the attacks on other American allies. Moreover,
Canada has intricate and intimate ties to the USA via the economy, culture and
politics. Thus McDonough concludes, “North
America represents a single target set, and its large territory, population,
and relatively porous borders mean that the region remains highly vulnerable to
terrorist infiltration and attack. Continental vulnerability can, however, be
partly alleviated by forward defence operations that disrupt and/or neutralize
the clandestine terrorist networks abroad, especially in places that serve as a
sanctuary (or central node) for these networks.”[30] Thus
this is the reason for Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan, as far as McDonough
and realists are concerned. However, this view accounts for only the initial
intervention and does not explain continued engagement in Afghanistan.
In conclusion, the neoclassic
realist has the best explanation for Canada’s significant engagement in
Afghanistan: the Canadian government’s desire for augmentation of its influence
in the eyes of America and the world. It
accounts for the government’s continued engagement in Afghanistan even after
there was not a lot of public support for it. The explanation is also supported
by 2005 International Policy Statement. Lastly, it explains the amount of
Canada’s participation, i.e., the reason why the participation was so
substantial, especially in the context of previously humble foreign
initiatives. The constructivist’s identity argument is only a partial
explanation of the phenomenon, because it does not account for the degree and the
duration of Canada’s engagement.
[1] S. David
McDonough, “The Paradox of Afghanistan: Stability Operations and the Renewal of
Canada’s International Security Policy,” International
Journal, 62:3 (2007): 626.
[2]
Christopher Kirkey and Nicholas Ostroy, “Why is Canada in Afghanistan?
Explaining Canada’s Military Commitment,” American
Review of Canadian Studies 40:2 (2010): 200.
[3]
Angus-Reid, “Canadians Divided on Assuming Non-Combat Role in Afghanistan,” 13
Dec. 2010, 9 Nov. 2012 <http://www.angus-reid.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/2010.12.13_Afghan_CAN.pdf>
[4]
Angus-Reid, “Canadians Divided on Afghanistan Mission,” 24 Feb.2010, 9 Nov. 2012 <http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/38430/canadians_divided_on_afghanistan_mission>
[5] Kyle Grayson, “Branding ‘Transformation’ in Canadian
Foreign Policy: Human security,” Canadian
Foreign Policy Journal, 11:2 (2004): 41.
[6] T. Joseph Sockel and J. Joel Sokolsky, “Canada
and The War in Afghanistan: NATO’s Odd Man Steps Forward,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 6:1 (2008): 102.
[7] Ibid. 102.
[8]
Christopher Kirkey and Nicholas Ostroy, “Why is Canada in Afghanistan?
Explaining Canada’s Military Commitment,” American
Review of Canadian Studies 40:2 (2010): 202.
[9] Ibid.
202.
[10] T. Joseph Sockel and J. Joel Sokolsky, “Canada
and The War in Afghanistan: NATO’s Odd Man Steps Forward,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 6:1 (2008): 105.
[11] Ibid.
105.
[12] Alex MacLeod et Dan
O’Meara (dir.), Théories de Relations internationales. Contestations et résistances,
2 édition (Montréal : Athéna, 2010) : 130.
[13] Ibid.
130.
[14] T. Joseph Sockel and J. Joel Sokolsky, “Canada
and The War in Afghanistan: NATO’s Odd Man Steps Forward,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 6:1 (2008): 105.
[15] S. David
McDonough, “The Paradox of Afghanistan: Stability Operations and the Renewal of
Canada’s International Security Policy,” International
Journal, 62:3 (2007): 622.
[16] T. Joseph Sockel and J. Joel Sokolsky, “Canada
and The War in Afghanistan: NATO’s Odd Man Steps Forward,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 6:1 (2008): 107.
[17] S. David
McDonough, “The Paradox of Afghanistan: Stability Operations and the Renewal of
Canada’s International Security Policy,” International Journal, 62:3 (2007):
623.
[18] Alex MacLeod et Dan
O’Meara (dir.), Théories de Relations internationales. Contestations et résistances, 2 édition (Montréal : Athéna, 2010) : 267.
[19]
Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social
Construction of Power Politics,” International
Organization, 46:2 (1992): 397.
[20] Kyle
Grayson, “Branding ‘Transformation’ in Canadian Foreign Policy: Human
security,” Canadian Foreign Policy
Journal, 11:2 (2004): 41.
[21] M.
Jennifer Welsh, “The 2005 International Policy Statement: Leading with
Identity?” International Journal,
61:4 (2006): 912.
[22] S. David
McDonough, “The Paradox of Afghanistan: Stability Operations and the Renewal of
Canada’s International Security Policy,” International
Journal, 62:3 (2007): 624.
[23] Ibid.
625.
[24] Ibid.
626.
[25] M.
Jennifer Welsh, “The 2005 International Policy Statement: Leading with
Identity?” International Journal,
61:4 (2006): 912.
[26] M.
Jennifer Welsh, “The 2005 International Policy Statement: Leading with
Identity?” International Journal,
61:4 (2006): 912.
[27] S. David
McDonough, “The Paradox of Afghanistan: Stability Operations and the Renewal of
Canada’s International Security Policy,” International
Journal, 62:3 (2007): 628-629.
[28] Alex MacLeod et Dan
O’Meara (dir.), Théories de Relations internationales. Contestations et résistances, 2 édition (Montréal : Athéna, 2010) : 85.
[29] Fatima
Ayub and Sari Kouvo, “Righting the Course? Humanitarian Intervention, the War
on Terror and the Future of Afghanistan,” International
Affairs, 84:4 (2008): 647.
[30] S. David
McDonough, “The Paradox of Afghanistan: Stability Operations and the Renewal of
Canada’s International Security Policy,” International
Journal, 62:3 (2007): 622.
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