The reason for the existence of any security sector in a country is to protect the citizens from external and internal security threats. Unfortunately, in many failed or fragile states, the insecurity often comes from the security sector itself. Indeed, in Haiti back in 1995, President Jean-Bertrand Aristide disbanded Haitian Armed Forces (FAd’H), which was accused of grave human rights abuses against Haitians civilians when it governed Haiti from 1991 to 1995.[1] It is estimated that during that time close to 4, 000 civilians were killed by the FAd’H.[2] In its place, Aristide created the Haitian National Police (HNP), which now includes “police, corrections, fire, emergency response, airport security, port security, and coast guard functions”.[3] However, the HNP was also involved in human rights abuses at the end of the 90’s.[4] The police officers were involved in “drug trafficking, kidnappings and extra judicial killings”.[5] Understandably, Haiti is one of the countries in which the citizens are very distrustful of the security forces due to their experience with the FAd’H and the HNP. This distrust needs to be remedied in order for the police officers to do their job effectively. However, after decades of abuses by the security sector and with current challenges it is facing, it will not be easy to do.
In 2004, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established by Security Council resolution 1542 to prevent the country from slipping into the state of anarchy after the ouster of the former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in February 2004.[6] Since then, it has been working with the government to help reform the HNP. However, Haiti has been vocal about its dissatisfaction with MINUSTAH forces, who have been accused of sexual abuses and spread of cholera epidemic, and aims to remove them as soon as possible. Before MINUSTAH forces fully withdraw, Haiti needs to develop its security sector to the point of self-sufficiency with a complete control over domestic security matters. This essay is set out to examine the contemporary reform of HNP’s by looking at the reform’s needs, challenges, and achievements. It will end with suggesting some recommendations for the reform. In order for the HNP to become a self-sufficient and responsible force, the Government of Haiti(GoH)needs to address the following problems: understaffing, underfunding, under-resourcing, political challenges, and internal organizational issues.
Needs and Challenges
Understaffing
The HNP is stretched very thin for Haiti’s population. For instance, while the UN recommended ratio of police to population is 1:450, in Haiti it was 1: 1816 in 2006 and 1: 986 in 2011. [7] This means that the current number of people per one officer is almost double of what it should be. Thus in order to respond to international police standards, MINUSTAH and the GoH decided to focus on the augmentation of the police force as their main goal in the HNP reform. However, they been not successful at achieving this goal for they did not attain their desired goal of 14,000 officers by 2011, as aspired to in the 2006-2011 Haitian National Police Development Plan. Instead, they reached only 10,106 officers by the end of June 2012, which translates into one officer per 952 people. [8][9] The current 2012-2016 Haitian National Police Development Plan aims to attain 15,000 officers by 2016, which would make the ratio of police officers to people 1:735.[10] Although attaining this number would be one step closer to the UN recommended ratio, it will be very hard to attain because it means training around 1,000 officers per year/per promotion. The last promotion, the 23rd promotion, fell short of its goal and graduated only 239 cadets, where it expected to have close to 600, which still falls short of the 1,000 cadets per promotion goal.[11][12] Although, the numbers of earlier promotions are higher, the promotions fall short on average by 200 cadets.[13]
Understaffing problem has a noticeable effect on the ground. Due to the understaffing, the HNP’s presence in the regions is at best inadequate and requires constant support of MINUSTAH.[14] Even in Port-au-Price where the police force is more concentrated compared to the rest of the country, there are still gross understaffing issues: only seven police officers are conducting criminal investigation in Port-au-Prince, whereas the Chief of UNPOL Judicial Police Unit believes they need closer to 20 investigators.[15] Consequently, only 80 out 908 murders have been investigated in 2011 and 42 out of 617 murders in the first nine months of 2012.[16] Since there were no additional officers added to the investigations unit in 2012, the lack of progress is not surprising. [17]
The training is a somewhat lengthy process: the basic training is seven months long, followed by a 12 month in-the-field training program.[18] As a result, the HNP took on 936 cadets for 22nd promotion as per the Office of Internal Oversight Services’ (OIOS) account, whereas the Police Academy in Port-au-Prince can only accommodate 700 cadets.[19] As there aren’t enough qualified instructors, the HNP and MINUSTAH crowd the existing classrooms. Indeed, the average class size is 60 cadets, which is twice the recommended size.[20]
Underfunding & Under-resourcing
One of major impediments to the HNP becoming an effective force is that it is “ill-equipped and poorly funded”, as concluded by the OIOS that audited MINUSTAH mission in August 2012.[21] Since the government does not have the funds, the external donors are the ones that fund the training of the cadets. The government is paying for the salaries; however, once the cadets graduate the government will have difficulty paying all the new officers their salaries. Furthermore, in order to reach the desired number of officers, the Reform plan intends to increase “the number of instructors within the Police School and [create] a body of instructors at the National Police Academy”, which will place further financial pressures on the government.[22] In order to accomplish this, the government will either strain its ability to pay the existing and new officers, or it will be further dependent on the external funding from donors, which is undesirable and unsustainable in the long run.
Furthermore, while the government’s annual budget is increasing; the percentage that is dedicated for the police reform is steadily decreasing – from 5.5% in 2006 to 4.8% in 2011.[23] On the one hand, it is puzzling that the HNP’s share of budget is decreasing while the HNP itself is increasing size due to the new graduates. On the other hand, the HNP has low absorption capacity. It is usually unable to absorb up to 18% of its budget on an annual basis, which worsens the under-resourcing issue. [24] The under-resourcing issue is bluntly evident in the HNP criminal investigations unit, which has “inadequate equipment and logistical support to conduct criminal investigations” as demonstrated by its lack of “basic equipment such as laser trajectory finder kit and ballistic comparative microscope and etc.”[25]
Political Challenges
On the 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index that scores countries on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean), Haiti’s public sector scores 19 and ranks 165th out of 175 countries.[26] Indeed, in the past year, the opposition has accused that the executive branch of anti-democratic practices, such as: “the politicization of State institutions such as the judiciary and the Haitian National Police...”.[27]
The level of corruption in Haiti is causing civil unrest. There are frequent anti-Government demonstrations occurred to protest lawlessness, the high cost of living, food insecurity, and the delivery of basic services. From August to October 2012, the number of demonstrations held per month tripled from 22 to 64, before decreasing in November and December.[28] Indeed, some instances of corruption are quite shocking. For example, the presidential advisor, Mercidieu Valentin Calixte, shot and killed a merchant in a bar altercation for which he was charged, but he served only seven months in detention at which point Judge Fernaud Judes-Paul released him, stating that there was “insufficient” evidence to connect Calixte to Derissaint’s murder. [29] Understandably, this level of corruption has a negative effect on the HNP’s proper functioning. Security sector is politicized in Haiti, where judges and high ranking police officers are promoted to senior positions on the basis of political loyalties, rather than merit. Moreover, the security sector is rampant with impunity. Even though Justice of the Peace for Chantal Barthelemy Vaval shot and killed Marc Sony Dorestant during a criminal proceeding that he was overseeing, he was not prosecuted or even investigated.[30]
Furthermore, the 2013 Failed States Index’s External Intervention indicator, which reflects the number of external assistance and actors, gives Haiti the score of 9.9 out of 10 (worst).[31] The state is overwhelmed by the multitude of external actors and donors who all have their own unique solutions to SSR. The state is struggling with coordinating and setting priorities for all of the groups. For instance, in 2009, there were 22 coordination groups managed by the Ministry of Planning and External Collaboration.[32] Understandably, there is an ownership deficit on the part of the government in regards to reform, where many local actors see SSR initiatives as being hijacked by the external actors who do not realize local realities. Indeed, the first reform plan was seen as “an attack on the sovereignty of the institution”, which prompted more inclusive process for the drafting of the second plan.[33]
HNP Internal Challenges
Back in 2008, the North-Sound Institute made a case study on the HNP that cited the internal governance issues such as “problems of coordination, transparency and accountability” and “complex and centralized hierarchy” as main concerns. [34] Due to the complexity of the HNP organization, stovepiping became a major issue - where the managers unnecessarily escalate issues to the Director General, which harms the efficiency of HNP’s operation.[35] Furthermore, due to the large number of external actors, the HNP’s individual departments seek external support, which undermines internal cohesion within the HNP.
Currently, the HNP functions under a multitude of authorities: the President of the Republic, the Supreme Council of the National Police (CSPN), the Minister of Justice and Public Safety, and the Secretary of State for Public Security. This multitude makes for a complex hierarchical system, which again slows down the HNP’s proper functioning.[36] Unfortunately, the government is further expanding the organization of the HNP. Although they are not functional yet, in the 2006-2011 Haitian National Police Development Plan, the government envisioned the creation of four more directorates, in addition to the three existing ones.[37] In addition to those expansions, the 2012-2016 Haitian National Police Development Plan envisions to further expand the HNP by adding: four more bureaus, three more General Directorates, a General Directorate Adjoint, a medical directorate, a directorate of wellbeing for officers, and adding Secretary of State of Public Security to the CSPN.[38]
Another disconcerting issue about the HNP organization is the flawed hierarchy. The Inspector General is under the authority of the Director General of the National Police and the Minister of Justice and Public Security. The Inspector General conducts inquiries into the allegations of human rights violations by police officers (i.e vetting) and recommends those who are to be dismissed. However, it is the Director General that has the power to act upon the recommendation, after confirming with the Minister of Justice and Public Security.[39] However, the Minister, who has the power to dismiss the Inspector General, is also responsible for the functioning of the ministry. Thus the Inspector General has the tricky job of making sure that his recommendations will be acceptable to the Minister and the Director General, otherwise it could cost him/her his job. Indeed, the Inspector General has been replaced three times in 2012, which as the United Nations Secretary-General rightly pointes out does “raise questions about the independence and the effectiveness of the oversight body”.[40] Consequently, the oversight body is not an independent body, which means its recommendations could be easily influenced by politics.[41]
Lastly, the current HNP’s current regulatory framework is outdated and disordered. The operation of HNP depends on around 70 general orders, guidelines and standard operating procedures; many of which were developed in emergency or as a transitional measures.[42] The Reform Plan 2012-2016, has described the General Inspectorate of the HNP as an entity that is “centralized and compartmentalised…[and] has limited functionality”, whose procedural framework is outdated and does not meet the current realities of the HNP.[43]
Achievements and the Way Forward
As of the end of 2011, the HNP and MINUSTAH put 4,462 out of 12,678 police officers through their joint certification and vetting process.[44] More importantly, 79 out of 139 police officers who have failed the vetting process have been dismissed by the Minister of Justice and Public Security.[45][46] However, even though a lot of officers have gone through the vetting process, it is far from being completed. Fortunately, in his March 2013 report, the Secretary General mentioned that the HNP and MINUSTAH have now started the vetting process of the applicants to HNP prior to their entry.[47] This is a step in the right direction as it will speed up the hiring process since the graduates will be able to work right out of the Academy, rather than waiting for the results of vetting to come in.
The issues that contributed to the low number of cadets in the 23rd promotion, the rigorousness of medical tests” and a weak recruiting campaign, have been fixed since the current 24th promotion consists of 1,102 cadets, who are due to graduate in October 2013. [48][49] This is a promising number as far as reaching the goal of 15,000 officers by 2016 goes. In order to speed up the hiring process further, the OIOS recommended that the medical exams would take place close to admission to the Academy; in addition to ensuring that the number of cadets does not exceed the amount of the Police Academy was meant to accommodate.[50]
However, fulfilling the desired 1,000 cadets per promotion quota means that the classrooms and the accommodations will be very overcrowded since the Academy is meant to accommodate 700 cadets. This issue puts into question the quality of the training these cadets receive. Considering the distrustful attitude of the populace towards the police, Haiti and MINUSTAH needs to focus on quality, rather than quantity. Producing a large amount of undertrained officers is likely to further insecurity since the officers will be unable to adequately deal with certain situations. Moreover, having more police officers does not necessarily translate into more security.
Indeed, in Bahrain in 2004, there were 8.5 officers per 454 people when the recommended amount is 1:454.[51] Yet, at the same time the security situation in Bahrain was deteriorating as the state jailed the political activists and U.S issued a travel warning.[52][53] Moreover, the median for Middle East region is 435.5 per 100 000, which is double the recommended amount.[54] Since the Middle East region is quite unstable, it is clear that having more police officers does not mean more security. Thus the GoH and MINUSTAH needs to focus on the quality of their police, rather than quantity. Before aggressively recruiting, the state should ensure that the cadets have proper training and resources to do their job effectively. In addition, the government needs to make sure that it can pay the salaries of all the officers it is producing; otherwise, these officers will be easily susceptible to corruption, which would further deteriorate the security environment.
Other than the increasing numbers of police officers, there are over successes for the HNP. In 2012, a lot of progress has been made in training and equipping the officers. For example, the automated fingerprint identification became fully operationalized, while searchable criminal database system was not far off from becoming fully functional.[55] Furthermore, MINUSTAH provided training to the HNP officers on: investigation techniques, crime scene management, fingerprint identification, searchable criminal database management, gender violence, anti-kidnapping, illicit drug trafficking, crime scene analysis, first aid, border activities, crowd control, judicial policing, and etc.[56][57] In addition, MINUSTAH, in conjunction with the HNP, developed human rights modules for basic training of cadets.[58]
Furthermore, the HNP has also received a lot funding and help from several bilateral partners, such as Canada and USA. The 2009-2014 USAID’s Program for Strengthened Rule of Law in Haiti focuses on the following areas: “strengthen[ing] National Justice Sector Institutions”, “improv[ing] Criminal Justice Service Delivery”, “improv[ing] access to justice”, and “improv[ing] effective Control Oversight of Justice Sector Operations”.[59] Among others projects, Canada’s Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) funded the following: the rehabilitation of four crossings and 14 police stations; the Coast Guard development activities; the acquisition of HNP vehicles; the construction of naval base in Les Cayes; first aid training for 7000 HNP members and disaster response training to high level officers.[60] From 2010 to 2012, Canadian DFAIT/START funded the First Aid Instructor Training in Haiti Project, which produced 200 First Aid trained instructors and 17 instructor-trainers certified within Haiti - in addition to “training 4500 police officers in basic First Aid and another 350 officers in Emergency Preparedness”.[61]
This “train the trainers” success story should be replicated in all other areas of the HNP reform. Indeed, the goal should be to train enough trainers and instructors in the HNP that the training can mostly be led by the HNP itself, while the MINUSTAH will be left to monitor the training and evaluate the graduating cadets. Even though switching the responsibility of cadets training from the MINUSTAH to the HNP will potentially slow down the training process, it will force the HNP leadership and the government to take ownership of security sector reform in Haiti. The government already mentioned in the HNP Reform plan that intends to increase “the number of instructors within the Police School and [create] a body of instructors at the National Police Academy”.[62] This intention should be expanded on in the next Reform plan and it should be followed thorough. However, the instructors should Haitians, rather than MINUSTAH peacekeepers. This transfer of responsibility will prepare way for the eventual full withdrawal of MINUSTAH. Moreover, a greater amount of responsibility and control over the training process will ensure the state oversees that the growth of HNP and takes responsibility for it: this will ensure that the number of new graduates does not exceed the amount of salaries the government can pay for or officers that it can properly equip and train. Moreover, in order for the HNP to become a self-sufficient and responsible force, the government needs to devolve more funding to the HNP and the HNP reform. Since the government’s annual budget has been increasing, it should not have a problem with proportionally increasing the HNP’s budget. However, before that can be done, the HNP’s absorption capacity needs to be increased.
Lastly, the government needs to address the internal issues of the HNP. The HNP cannot function without a proper regulatory system. A committee should be established to update and harmonize the general orders, guidelines and standard operating procedures to reflect the current realities. Furthermore, the chain of authority and hierarchy issues should be dealt with. More importantly, the chain of authority should be simplified by combining directorates, rather than multiplying them.
[1]Johanna
Mendelson-Forman, "Security Sector Reform in Haiti," International
Peacekeeping 13.1 (2006): 17.
[3] "World Report
2012: Haiti," Human Rights Watch, N.p., Jan. 2012, Web 1 Oct. 2013
<http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/haiti> 8.
[4] "A/53/950
Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti," UN News Center, UN, 10 May 1999, Web 01 Oct.
2013.
[5] Johanna
Mendelson-Forman, "Security Sector Reform in Haiti," International
Peacekeeping 13.1 (2006): 22.
[6] "Towards a
Post-MINUSTAH Haiti: Making an Effective Transition," International
Crisis Group, N.p., 2 Aug. 2012, Web 01 Oct. 2013
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/044-towards-a-post-minustah-haiti-making-an-effective-transition.aspx>
1.
[7] R. J. May, Policy Making and Implementation: Studies from Papua New Guinea, Acton, A.C.T.: (ANU E Press: 2009): 239.
[8]
Haitian National Police Reform Plan 2006 p 4
[9] Plan
De Développement De La PNH 2012-2016, (Port-Au-Prince: La Direction Générale De La
Police Nationale, 2012) : 14 < http://docs.com/RM8F>.
[11]
Report
of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(S/2011/540),
UN, 25 Aug. 2011, Web 01 Oct. 2013, 5.
[12]
Report
of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(S/2013/139),
UN, 12 Mar. 2013, Web, 01 Oct. 2013, 6.
[13]Plan
De Développement De La PNH 2012-2016, (Port-Au-Prince: La Direction Générale De La
Police Nationale, 2012) : 62 < http://docs.com/RM8F>.
[14]
Report
of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(S/2011/540),
UN, 25 Aug. 2011, Web 01 Oct. 2013, 3.
[15] "The United
Nations Police Operations in MINUSTAH," The Office of Internal
Oversight Services, OIOS, 24 Aug. 2012, Web 1 Oct. 2013
<usun.state.gov/documents/organization/199303.pdf> 4.
[16] Ibid., 4.
[17] Ibid., 5.
[18] "UN Police
Magazine 8th Ed." UN. N.p., Jan. 2012. Web. 1 Oct. 2013.
<www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/unpolmag/unpolmag_08.pdf> 9.
[19] "The Haitian
National Police development programme in MINUSTAH," The Office of
Internal Oversight Services, OIOS, 17 May 2012, Web 1 Oct. 2013, 4.
[21] "The United
Nations Police Operations in MINUSTAH," The Office of Internal
Oversight Services, OIOS, 24 Aug. 2012, Web 1 Oct. 2013
<usun.state.gov/documents/organization/199303.pdf> 4.
[22] Plan
De Développement De La PNH 2012-2016, (Port-Au-Prince: La Direction Générale De La
Police Nationale, 2012) : 27.
[25] "The United
Nations Police Operations in MINUSTAH," The Office of Internal
Oversight Services, OIOS, 24 Aug. 2012, Web 1 Oct. 2013 <usun.state.gov/documents/organization/199303.pdf
>5.
[26] "Corruption
Perceptions Index 2012 View Results Table View Brochure," 2012
Corruption Perceptions Index, N.p., 2012, Web 01 Oct. 2013
<http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/>.
[27] Report of the Secretary-General
on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (S/2013/139), UN, 12
Mar. 2013, Web, 01 Oct. 2013, 2.
[28] Report of the
Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(S/2013/139), UN, 12 Mar. 2013, Web, 01 Oct. 2013, 3.
[30] "World Report
2012: Haiti," Human Rights Watch, N.p., Jan. 2012, Web 1 Oct. 2013
<http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/haiti> 2.
[31] http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable
[32]
"Security
Sector Reform Monitor." CIGI. N.p., May 2009. Web. 1 Oct. 2013.
<www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/SSR%20Monitor%20Haiti_No1_0.pdf>..
[33]Ibid.
[34] Isabelle Fortin and Yves-François Pierre, "Haiti
and the Reform of the Haitian National Police," The North South
Institute (n.d.): n. pag. Web 1 Oct. 2013, 1.
[35] "The Haitian
National Police development programme in MINUSTAH," The Office of
Internal Oversight Services, OIOS, 17 May 2012, Web 1 Oct. 2013, 3.
[36] Plan
De Développement De La PNH 2012-2016, (Port-Au-Prince: La Direction Générale De La
Police Nationale, 2012): 81.
[41] Ibid.
[42]Plan
De Développement De La PNH 2012-2016, (Port-Au-Prince: La Direction Générale De La
Police Nationale, 2012): 82.
[44] "The Haitian
National Police development programme in MINUSTAH," The Office of
Internal Oversight Services, OIOS, 17 May 2012, Web 1 Oct. 2013, 5.
[45] Report of the
Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(S/2013/139), UN, 12 Mar. 2013, Web, 01 Oct. 2013, 6.
[46] "The Haitian
National Police development programme in MINUSTAH," The Office of
Internal Oversight Services, OIOS, 17 May 2012, Web 1 Oct. 2013, 5.
[47] Report of the
Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(S/2013/139), UN, 12 Mar. 2013, Web, 01 Oct. 2013, 6.
[49] "24ème
Promotion De La PNH : L’avenir De La Police D’Haïti Passe Par Les Femmes,"
MINUSTAH, N.p., n.d. Web 01 Oct. 2013 <http://www.minustah.org/en/24eme-promotion-de-la-pnh-lavenir-de-la-police-dhaiti-passe-par-les-femmes/>.
[50] "The Haitian
National Police development programme in MINUSTAH," The Office of
Internal Oversight Services, OIOS, 17 May 2012, Web 1 Oct. 2013, 7.
[51] "International
Statistics on Crime and Justice, " UNODC, European Institute
for Crime Prevention And Control, 2010.
Web. 1 Oct. 2013
<www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Crime-statistics/International_Statistics_on_Crime_and_Justice.pdf>
135.
[52] "FIDH Concerned
at Deteriorating Human Rights Situation,” Bahrain Center for Human Rights, Bahrain
Rights, 19 May 2004, Web. 01 Oct. 2013,
<http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/> .
[53] "U.S. Issues New
Bahrain Travel Warning." CNN. Cable News Network, 4 July 2004. Web.
01 Oct. 2013. <http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/07/04/bahrain.travel.warning/>.
[54] "International
Statistics on Crime and Justice, " UNODC, European Institute
for Crime Prevention And Control, 2010.
Web. 1 Oct. 2013 <www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Crime-statistics/International_Statistics_on_Crime_and_Justice.pdf>
115.
[55] "The United
Nations Police Operations in MINUSTAH," The Office of Internal
Oversight Services, OIOS, 24 Aug. 2012, Web 1 Oct. 2013 <usun.state.gov/documents/organization/199303.pdf>
5, 9.
[56] Ibid., 5, 9.
[57] Report of the Secretary-General
on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (S/2011/540), UN, 25
Aug. 2011, Web 01 Oct. 2013, 5.
[58] Ibid.
[60] Plan
De Développement De La PNH 2012-2016, (Port-Au-Prince: La Direction Générale De La
Police Nationale, 2012): 68.
[61]
"St
John Canada in Haiti – A Success Story." St John Canada in Haiti –
A Success Story. N.p., n.d. Web. 01 Oct. 2013.
<http://www.sja.ca/Canada/AboutUs/Worldwide/Pages/StJohnCanadainHaiti–ASuccessStory.aspx>.
[62] Plan
De Développement De La PNH 2012-2016, (Port-Au-Prince: La Direction Générale De La
Police Nationale, 2012)
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