Memorandum
to Cabinet
Canada’s
Engagement in Haiti: Change of Strategy?
25 November, 2013
The Minister
of Foreign Affairs
MINISTERIAL
RECOMMENDATIONS
ISSUE
In light
of MUNISTAH's withdrawal and the lack of progress in Haiti, how should Canada engage
with Haiti in the future?
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that:
The
Government of Canada should change its engagement strategy in Haiti until 2018
from focusing on humanitarian aid to focusing aggressively on reforming the
security sector, specifically: justice, police and corrections by redirecting $16 million from Development
section of DFATD in order to double the annual budget for Haiti under the Global Peace and
Security Program (GPSP).
This recommendation will affect
the following authorities: the Department of Public Safety Canada, the RCMP,
and the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. The
infrastructure for this recommendation currently exists. It will be is simply a
matter for reallocation: the annual budget for Haiti under the DFATD’s GPSP is
doubled from $16 million to $32 million by channeling funds away from
Development section of DFATD to Foreign Affairs section, under which the
Stabilization and Reconstruction Programming Division of the Stabilization and
Reconstruction Task Force (START) is situated and manages the GPSP. The funding
implications are that there will be fewer funds available for the humanitarian
needs for that time period.
RATIONALE
A
re-evaluation of Canada’s current strategy in Haiti is required because Canada
spent millions in Haiti and yet, the progress on economic, security and social
fronts is dismal. Haiti’s
GNI per capita decreased by about 41 % between 1980 and 2012. On the 2012 Human
Development Index, Haiti scored 0.456, which is below the average of 0.466 for
countries in the low human development group of the HDI and below the average
of 0.741 for countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Even though
CIDA spent over $280 million over the course of 2010-2012, in the 2012 HDI, which combines the indicators of life
expectancy, educational attainment, and income, Haiti was placed 161 out of
187. Considering that from 2006 to 2011 Canada spent over $520 million on Haiti
without attaining desired results, Canada needs a new strategy for its
engagement in Haiti.
Furthermore, the
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MUNISTAH) has been central in
improving the situation in Haiti. However, due to domestic unpopularity,
MUNISTAH is aiming to withdraw by May 2014. Since Haiti’s security situation is
extremely dependent on peacekeeping troops due to lack a functional security
force of its own, it is likely that the security situation in Haiti will quickly
deteriorate after their withdraw. Thus Haiti’s security sector must be a
priority in our near-future engagement in Haiti.
BACKGROUND AND
CONSIDERATIONS
The Haitian National Police (HNP) was created in
1995 by President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, when he disbanded Haitian Armed Forces (FAd’H) due to
gross human rights abuses. The HNP is now responsible for police, corrections,
fire, emergency response, airport security, port security, and coast guard
functions. Since 2004, the MINUSTAH has worked with the HNP to build up its
capacity to perform all of the functions. MINUSTAH remains irreplaceable as the
only institution that can provide stability and security in Haiti. It is essential
in creating a secure environment required for development.
However, MINUSTAH is due to withdraw its peacekeepers because of a unanimous
Haitian Senate resolution that requires them to do so by May 2014. This push is
due to allegations that some UN Peacekeepers were responsible for sexual abuses
and the spread of cholera epidemic.
Considering the
reliance of the HNP on the MUNISTAH and its many needs, security sector reform
needs to be aggressively addressed before and after withdraw of peacekeeping
troops. The most prominent are issues are understaffing, underfunding, and internal
organizational issues. The HNP is stretched very thin for Haiti’s population:
the UN recommended ratio of police to population is 1:450, in Haiti it was 1:
986 in 2011. The HNP aims to graduate 1000 cadets per promotion, but it usually
falls on average by 200 cadets. Due to the understaffing, the HNP’s presence in
the regions is at best inadequate and requires constant MUNISTAH support. Haiti
has acquired $175 million American dollars for the HNP reform, while the HNP
Reform Plan estimates that close to $700 million American dollars is needed for
education, transportation, infrastructure, non-lethal equipment police, weapons, ammunition and communication.
Furthermore, the
HNP’s current regulatory framework is in grave disorder. The operation of HNP depends on around 70 general orders,
guidelines and standard operating procedures; many of which were developed in
emergency or as a transitional measures. Lastly, the chain of authority in the
HNP is not defined or respected, which greatly hinders the efficiency of the
organization.
These and other issues of the HNP give rise to a very
insecure environment. The 2013 Failed
States Index gave Haiti the score of 9.8 out of 10 (worst) for the Security
Apparatus indicator, which reflects state’s monopoly on the use of force.
Consequently, the crime evolution in Haiti over the period of 2007 to 2011 has
been extremely high: rape increased by 227%, murder increased by 85%, theft by
2468% and assaults by 1128%. The
2013 Global Peace Index’s Societal
Safety and Security category reflects the astonishing crime rate in
Haiti. Scoring from best to worst from 1 to 5, Haiti scored 4 out of 5 for
homicides, violent crime, violent demonstrations, and perceived criminality in
society.
If Canada chooses to focus on its funding on security sector,
it would be in line with the appeals of the Secretary-General in his March 2013
report. He urges for the Government of Haiti and its external partners to “continue to build the capacity of those institutions
and put an end to a pervasive culture of impunity that continues to hinder
progress in Haiti”.[1] In particular, he is concerned with “the lack of
progress in building the capacity of the judiciary in Haiti, which negatively
affects the criminal justice system as a whole”.[2] The low capacity of and high corruption within the judiciary
lead to lawlessness, which inhibits investment and growth of the economy.
Canada is well
situated to take a more aggressive role, and perhaps a leading role, in Haiti’s
security sector reform. Canada has
strong historical and cultural links with Haiti. Many of Canadian staff in the
security sector are French-speaking, which is vital asset when it comes to
training in Haiti. Canada has already provided Canadian police offers and legal
experts through MUNISTAH in order to implement much needed reforms in the
police and judiciary. Furthermore, to facilitate the multi-departmental
engagement with MUNISTAH on security matters, Canada created a partnership
called the Canadian Police Arrangement that involves the Department of Public
Safety Canada, the RCMP, and the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and
Development. The Canadian Police Arrangement eases the communication and
coordination between partners when it comes to capacity building and
training/mentoring in the security sector abroad.
Furthermore, Canada
has been quite active in security sector reform in Haiti thus taking a more
active role will not require starting from scratch. Through the GPSP, START has
funded projects such as: the rehabilitation
of 14 police stations, the construction of a new building for the General Inspectorate, the construction of a naval base in Les
Cayes, the training of officers in disaster response and first aid. Canada has typically
had four Canadian Forces staff officers and up to 100 police serving with the
UN Stabilization Mission. Additional experts are deployed as required at the
UN’s request to assist with the implementation of the MINUSTAH mandate.
By
promoting a robust security
sector, Canada will foster an environment that allows for the establishment and enforcement of property rights, and the
creation of legitimate institutions to maintain public order and safety. Such
an environment will provide the foundations for a market-based economy that is
a more sustainable way (in comparison to just providing humanitarian aid) to
lift Haiti out of its poverty.
Further promotion of security sector is in line
with the current Canadian engagement in Haiti. Canada has been active in United
Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti by enhancing policing, improving
conditions for prisoners, strengthening borders, increasing community security,
and establishing front-line justice. A stronger security focus, supported by
greater funding, will allow Canada to make greater strides in providing a secure
environment for a market-based economy.
OPTIONS
1. Continue with the current
priority themes - increasing food security,
securing the future of children and youth, stimulating sustainable economic
growth - in the Development section of DFATD and continue with START’s work on
security with the usual budget.
This option requires no legislative
or regulatory action. START will continue managing security initiatives in
Haiti with its current budget and make steady headway towards improving the
security situation. Unfortunately, this option does not account for the effect of
the withdrawal of MUNISTAH forces will have on the security situation in Haiti.
The crime is likely to increase, and the undermanned HNP is likely to become
overwhelmed with all of the security issues. Such a scenario will likely lead
to quick deterioration of the current security environment and all of the gains
in security and economy stimulation will be lost.
2.
Change the engagement
strategy in Haiti until 2018 from focusing on humanitarian aid to focusing
aggressively on reforming the security sector, specifically: justice, police
and corrections by redirecting $16
million from the Development section of DFATD in order to double the annual
budget for Haiti under the GPSP.
This option will allow Canada reinvigorate its
efforts in the promotion of a robust security sector that is necessary to
enforce property rights and create conditions for market based economy that
will begin lifting Haiti out of its poverty in a sustainable way.
By increasing the funding of START for security
projects in Haiti, Canada can begin to aggressively address the HNP issues:
understaffing, underfunding and internal organizational issues. The following
are some of the main projects START, with the help of the Canadian Police Arrangement, will contribute to with the new funding (a detailed
analysis of the projects and their costs will be given in Annex C):
START will contribute to the funding of the
construction of the second National Police Academy, in Ganthier (2014-2016 - est.
total $34,200,000.00). START will also be able fund annual bursaries
for 250 Haitian officers to train in foreign
countries for the period of
formal execution of the HNP
Reform Plan (est. total - $ 3,992,900.000). In 2014, START will be able to fund and finish
the construction of the building for the
Central Directorate of the Judicial Police in Port-au-Prince (est. total $
1,200,000.00), along with three new detective offices in three out of ten
Departments of Haiti (est. total per unit $ 800,000.00 – total $ 2,400,000.00).
It will continue building three regional detective offices per year until 2016,
in an effort to help reduce crime rate in Haiti. In 2011, CIDA partnered with several universities
in Quebec to fund the construction of the Police School that will provide basic
training and training for special units. START can join this project by funding
the construction of 30 permanent classes in the school over the course of 2014-2015
(est. total - $ 5,100,000.00). Furthermore, START can take an initiative in
building two regional police schools over the course of 2014-2015 (est. total -
$ 8,000,000.00). START can also help
the HNP with the equipping of the soldiers: purchase and maintenance of
transport vehicles (est. total $ 52,540,000.00), purchase of arms (est. total -
$ 22,655,000.00), and purchase of uniforms (est. total -$ 4,122,000.00). All of
these issues are crucial to tackle before the full withdrawal of U N troops in
order to sustain the current security environment. The HNP cannot afford to tackles
its issues on its own as its current $127 million budget is mostly spent on the
salaries of the officers, which are steadily increasing in number.
It will be best to think of the shift to security
sector reform in long-term terms; however, five years should be enough time to
see if the change of strategy has altered the security environment. If not, the
strategy will need to be re-evaluated in the context of that time.
Since this option requires a reallocation of funds
from one section of DFATD to another section, there will not be any need for
new funds. There will not be any need for legislative or regulatory actions. START
will be able to just fund more projects related to current issues.
Furthermore, concentrating more of Canada’s efforts on one
aspect of the spectrum of engagement options in a fragile state will increase
the impact and decrease transactions costs associated with coordination and
communication between many initiatives in different areas of engagement. The Development
section of DFATD would continue to provide humanitarian aid and programs in
Haiti, but the focus will be for DFATD’s START program with a focus on security
sector reform in order to create a more stable and secure environment before UN
troops withdraw. The stable security environment is needed for economic growth
and social progress, thus it should be a priority.
3. Change the engagement strategy in Haiti until 2018 from focusing on
humanitarian aid to focusing aggressively on reforming the security sector,
specifically: justice, police and corrections by increasing the annual budget for Haiti under the GPSP by $30 million.
This option is more aggressive both in its financial
demand and its ability to contribute to a meaningful change in Haiti’s security
sector. It differs from the above option by $4 million because it was assessed
that the Development section will not be able to redirect $20 million dollars
to START and still do its job at the current level of effectiveness. It should be kept in mind that humanitarian
aid will help to change the conceivably worsening security situation after UN withdraw as it will only serve to
alleviate the suffering, which is not a sustainable way to deal with a
worsening security situation.
The timeframe and the analysis of the costs will be
similar to option 2. START will just have more funding for initiatives in the security
sector reform. As this option concerns the spending of public funds,
legislative action will be required. Since the legislative process takes a
while, the downside of this option is the loss of time at a time when time is
precious. On the upside, as mentioned, it will allow START to contribute more
meaningfully to security sector reform and hopefully prevent any
destabilization of security environment following the withdrawal of the UN
troops.
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