Life in the DRC - Local Focus

In this post, I will analyze the conflict in the DRC on the local level.

Background - This background is somewhat of a summary of an excellent book called The Trouble with the Congo by Séverine Autesserre. The main message of the book is to point out the failures of UN in the DRC, which I will not get into. However, I did think her well-rounded description of the historical issues in the DRC is a good start for my conflict analysis. But, you can skip down to more present-day analysis. J So here we go!

The DRC is one of those ill-fated countries that has not known peace for many decades.  Indeed, in the 90’s, the DRC has been through two wars. However, the DRC's issues have started at least in 1930’s when the Belgians sent tens of thousands of Rwandans to work for the plantations in the Kivus provinces. Since the Congolese chiefs allowed Belgians to bring the Rwandans only on the condition that they would not have any political rights, the Rwandans were left with a very ambiguous political status. In particular, they were denied indigenous status, which would allow them to own land. However, the Belgians did put a disproportionate amount of Rwandans into local administration, to the dismay of the Congolese.  This added fuel to fire as there were already issues with land availability.

Land was awarded by the local chiefs to those who had an indigenous status, which again Rwandans did not.  Land issue became more prominent in 60s-70s when thousands of Rwandan Tutsis fled to the Kivus in order to escape the prosecution in Rwanda. The tensions increased further when Rwandan Hutus fled to the Kivus because of 1994 Rwandan genocide.  Soon after, in 1996, the 1^st Congo War began, which was closely followed by the 2^nd Congo War in 1998.  The close proximity of the wars is not surprising, considering that the 2nd Congo War started in large part because of President’s Kabila alienation of his Rwandan and Ugandan war allies and the expulsion of their force from the DRC after the 1st war.[1] Although the wars have technically ended, the DRC has not enjoyed a period of peace since then.

On the local level, one of the prominent issues is the lack of land. Consequently, land disputes happen often and usually turn violent and deadly.  In 1973, Mobutu passed a General Property Law that nationalized all land thus taking power away from the chiefs, who usually handed it out. Furthermore, a lot of young peasants were deprived of the access to land due to this law. As a result, their survival opportunities decreased and tensions increased at the local level, which lead to small scale violence.

In the late 80’s, tensions began brewing between the Congolese Hutus and the Congolese Tutsis of Rwandan descent because the Hutus who came to the Kivus tried to affirm their power and diminish the Tutsi influence. As the Rwandan Hutu refugees arrived in 1994, the Rwandan Tutsis in the DRC feared that they would be attacked as their ethnic kin were in Rwanda.  At the same time, the Congolese radicalized against all Rwandans. They blamed Rwandan ethnic tensions for increasing violence in the DRC in general, in addition to already existing land and political disagreements they had with Congolese of Rwandan descent.  All of these tensions over time blew up into a 1996 war.

During the war, the militias switched alliances as it served their needs. Some militia groups fragmented and began fighting each other.  All of the fighting reinforced local tensions, led to militarization of some and decentralised others as militias followed their own local agendas, most notably in South Kivu, North Katanga, and Ituri. However, in general, militias rarely fought with each other and instead targeted unarmed civilians to gain power by either preventing them from collaborating with other groups or punishing those who have done so.

Local

The violence in the South and North Kivu has existed for decades. A lot of it is driven by the competition over land. Since local administration and central governance is weak at best, the local chiefs fill the power vacuum. Even today, they play a prominent role when it comes to the distribution of land. However, they have been losing the support of local populations due to their involvement in patronage and sales of communal land without informing the communities.[2] Although their authority is now often questioned, there is little help for the locals from elsewhere. Indeed, even though the tribunals for land disputes are accessible, the hierarchy between them is not clearly defined, which results in of the tribunals’ overruling of each other’s decisions. [3] Naturally, this uncertainty in the rulings creates tension, which again tends to turn into violence over time.

Perhaps more importantly, there are different laws that apply to resolving land disputes and they often contradict each other. For instance, the Constitution gives investment rights to Congolese and foreigners, while the Agriculture Law states that only the ethnically Congolese people may own land.[4] Furthermore, land governance framework is in disarray. There is a multitude of systems, such as “a statutory land system, customary systems and informal governance practices” that oversee the access and the use of land. [5] There is not much harmonization among the systems, which tends to lead to conflicts when one system is pitted against another in a land dispute.

All of these issues are further complicated by the inter-ethnic competition. Since there is limited arable land, land conflicts are prominent in heavily populated areas. They often turn violent. This problem is intensified by massive displacement caused by armed groups activities or clashes with the army. In South Kivu, a lot of pastoralists are Tutsi Banyamulenge (Congolese of Rwandan descent) who often dispute with customary chiefs and farmers over land use. Pastoralists need the land for their cattle to graze on, which at least partially destroys farmers (usually ethnic Congolese) crops. Unfortunately, due to ethnic competition the land disputes often involve armed groups, and consequently, violence and death.[6] An example of a land dispute can be found in the Ruzizi plain, which is located between at the border of South Kivu and Burundi. There, the disputes between the Barundi (20% of population) and the Bafuliro (80% of population) communities about land and traditional leadership have long ended up in violence.[7]  In 2010, the chefferie (mainly made of those from the Bafuliro community) has created its own security force, the FALL armed group, to protect the Bafuliro from the Forces democratiques pour la liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) when the DRC Armed Forces (FARDC) were unable to do so. Unfortunately, the FALL quickly became predatory and began imposing “taxes” and demanding payoffs at checkpoints from the population.[8] This brings us to the next prominent local issue, the armed groups.

Armed Groups

Although not all of the armed groups are local, all of them do have local implications: massive displacement and insecurity. Before entering the analysis of the armed groups in the DRC, one should place oneself in the shoes of the local population. Massive insecurity that stems from inter-ethnic conflict, predatory armed forces, vicious armed groups, and incompetent government creates an environment of desperate people in desperate situations. This is important to keep at the back of one’s mind especially when analyzing armed groups. In particular, it is important to consider when thinking about disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration in the DRC, or elsewhere really.

For the past two years, the FARDC was actively engaged in fighting with the armed group called the Mouvement du 23 mars (M23). The group officially surrendered and signed an agreement with the government in mid-December 2013, after robust operations against it by the FARDC and MONUSCO in October 2013.[9] M23 are former members of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), who turned against the government due to the poor conditions in the army and the government's unwillingness to implement the 23 March 2009 peace deal. M23 was supported by Rwanda and Uganda in 2012, especially in the offensives that led to capture of a very commercially active city, Goma.[10] However, in 2013 support from Uganda weaned, mostly likely due to international pressure and the lack of a strong incentive that Rwanda continued to have .[11] Indeed, the support from the Government of Rwanda continued mostly likely because M23 aimed to overthrow the government, and extremely resource poor country such as Rwanda could have substantially benefited from having a friendly indebted-to-it DRC government that would oversee an immensely resource rich territory.  Indeed, M23 recruited a lot of demobilized Rwandan soldiers and received support from Rwandan officers, who helped to prevent those soldiers from returning home.[12] However, when internal division within M23 began, Rwandan officials decided to support the new leader because they began to feel that they could not control the original leader Ntaganda and his network. This development is understandable since there isn't much use for Rwanda to help install a new government in the DRC that it would not be able to control.  The internal division within M23, however, weakened it, which eventually lead to its defeat.[13]

As for financing, M23 taxed commercial trucks, from $200 to $1000 per truck that crossed its checkpoints at Kibumba and Kiwanja in North Kivu. In Goma, they looted more than $3million.[14] Other armed groups, such as the FDLR, are involved in gold mining to finance their activities. The FDLR operates in Lubero Territory in North Kivu. While in Walikale, gold mines are controlled by Ria Mutomboki and Mai Mai Simba armed groups.[15] In Orientale Province, Mai Mai Morgan group robbed miners of their cold.[16]  All of these “financing” activities have naturally contributed to the insecurity in the region, human rights violations, and displacement. Indeed, the armed groups often engage in forced recruitment, child recruitment, killings, lootings, abductions, sexual violence, and other human rights violations.[17] The armed forces were responsible for at least 135 cases of rapes from 20 to 30 November 2012 in the South Kivu.[18] The displacement of people has reached astonishing heights: in December 2013, Secretary General stated that 2.7 million people have been internally displaced within the DRC.[19] Thus for the locals, the picture is quite bleak all around. Inter-ethnic tensions, violence perpetrated by the armed groups and the armed forces, and  a distrust in the protection provided by the law are daily realities of those living in the DRC.

Recommendations

In order to move towards peace in the DRC, land issues need to be solved. The starting point for this should be the harmonization of the laws that deal with land disputes, usage or ownership.  Indeed, a new Agricultural Law should be passed that will be the ultimate authority on land issues and that will override parts of any other legal statues that deal with issues relating to land. The law should state all of the relevant information about owning land, using it or resolving conflicts in regards to it. It should clearly define and limit the powers of local chiefs.  It should also describe the process one should go through in order to get a hearing at a tribunal and identify a higher authority which to address when looking to for an appeal. 

That being said, one tribunal should not have the legal authority to overrule the decision of another tribunal. If one of the parties goes to another tribunal to get a more favourable ruling than the other party could present documents that the case has already been tried previously and the party that tried to launch a new case should have to pay a fee for trying to abuse the justice system. However, an entity should exist that would hear the appeals that originate from the tribunals’ rulings.  It is essential that the legal framework is not only organized, but that there is a clear hierarchy within the system, where only one entity exists per each level.  Furthermore, the land governance framework also needs to be streamlined as the current multitude of systems, practices and institutional frameworks (such a statutory land system, customary systems and a variety of informal land governance practices) creates conflicts since two people can claim rights for the same land under two different systems. The legal and land governance system should be publicized heavily by every institution (UN, NGOs, all of the government institutions) in the local languages thus spreading the knowledge as widely as possible. If knowledge is power, the DRC needs to limit the concentration of power at the hands of the few (i.e. chiefs).

A harder issue to address is the issue of armed groups. It is important to remember that often the “recruited” people have been either forced or dubbed into joining the group with a promise of pay or better life.  People in the DRC are desperate people in desperate circumstances. Always fearing for your life, never having enough to eat, being constantly immersed in violence and seeing all of the problems being solved with guns will make anyone want to pick up a gun in order to give oneself and/or his family a fighting chance.  No one likes feeling powerless.

Thus the the DRC government and UN need to focus on changing the structures that form the desperate circumstances rather than focusing on chasing down the armed groups.  As long as the desperate circumstances exist, desperate people will exist as well… and so will the armed groups. In order to change the structures which create the desperate circumstances, the government needs to begin by fixing their legal system, starting with the harmonization of the land laws and land governance systems in particular, and the legal system in general. With a clearly defined laws and legal system, a just application of the law will be easier – although granted, it will probably take decades for the application to get in the proximity of just (due to the level of corruption), but you have to start somewhere.

---

[1] Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 194

[2] "Dealing With Land Issues and Conflict in Eastern Congo: towards an integrated and participatory approach". Report on Seminar held in Brussels on 20-21 September 2012, 4

[3] Ibid 3

[4] Ibid 3

[5] Ibid 3

[6] Ibid 6

[7]" Understanding Conflict in Eastern Congo: The Ruzizi Plain", International Crisis Group, Africa Report #206, 23 July 2013 http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/206-comprendre-les-conflits-dans-lest-du-congo-i-la-plaine-de-la-ruzizi.pdf  p1

[8] Ibid 11

[9] http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/757 p4

[10] http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Uganda--Rwanda-helped-M23---UN-report/-/688334/1636598/-/105wvv7z/-/index.html

[11] Expert Group on the DRC - S/2013/433- http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/433 p4

[12] Ibid

[13] Ibid 6

[14] Ibid

[15] Ibid 35

[16] Ibid

[17] Secretary General Report on the DRC -S/2013/388 - http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/388 p.28

[18] Expert Group on the DRC - S/2013/433- http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/433 p.29

[19]Secretary General Report on the DRC- S/2013/757- http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/757 p6

Syria: It's more complicated than you think.

And yet again a conflict in the Middle East consumes most of the media attention... The crisis in Syria is a very complicated issue, the resolution of which is much more elusive than is portrayed by the 2 minute media segments. Indeed, it is more complicated than most people realize. In this post I would like to point out some of the complexities of the Syrian crisis, in particular the complexities of the two sides.

Side A: Assad’s regime. He is not the most popular fellow in the Western media. His regime has allegedly killed over 100 000 people; although, it is quite likely that the rebels have greatly contributed to that number in same indiscriminate manner. Assad also allegedly used chemical weapons against civilians, although no one ever actually given any proof of that. This accusation painfully reminds me of similar accusations that USA has made when it came to Iraq (Sadam Hussein and his alleged nuclear weapons). However, it should be pointed out that Assad’s regime has been quite cooperative with the demands of the international community. Assad has cooperated with the UN on the chemical weapons issue, and he is open to attending Geneva 2 peace talks. Of course, he does not consider his resignation as a possible option, but he is open to discussing other options (which he does not really need to since his troops have been doing pretty well on the ground. Furthermore, the rebels have been losing the territories they gain due to lack of people’s support in those areas.)

Assad’s regime is supported by Russia, China, and Iran. Russia supports Assad’s regime because of their economic ties (arms exports and major investments in Syria's infrastructure); plus Russia worries about the spread of Islamic militancy in the region – which is very likely if the rebels win. Iran needs Syria to balance against Saudi Arabia and USA. Since USA took out two of its neighbours -Afghanistan and Iraq- and since Iran sits in between them, it rightly feels a bit uncomfortable at this point thus it needs Syria. Furthermore, Assad’s regime is mostly Alawites, which is a Shiite offshoot. Since Iran population is mostly Shiite Muslims, there are also religious ties/loyalties. As for China, it was Syria's third-largest importer in 2010; thus it has some economic interests, plus, for obvious reasons, it wants to discourage the liberal intervention theory that allows other countries to meddle in the internal affairs of nations. Now to the other side, which is favoured by the West.

Side B: the rebels or the opposition, which vaguely reminds me of the Lernaean Hydra - lots of heads none of which are of much use. The Hydra’s body, that gives rise to the numerous heads, consists of three main regional actors: Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Acting in clumsy unison, this beast does not have its heart (or heads) set on peaceful and functioning Syria.

Why? Well, Turkey (and USA for that matter) has long disliked Iran, who has close friendly relations with Syria. If Syria is to fall, Iran becomes more vulnerable . As an added bonus, Turkey will be able to take a bite out of a fallen or weakened Syria (more land for Turkey = possible revival of Ottoman Empire in their eyes?). Furthermore, religious (Wahhabi sect of Islam as the state religion – it is an ultra-conservative branch of Sunni Islam) Qatar and Saudi Arabia also have something to gain – a fall of secular government in the region. Thus it is not surprising that the majority of rebel groups are extreme Islamists that would like the Muslim Brotherhood (Sunni) to take power in Syria (which has not worked out well for Egypt thus far). Although the majority of the Syrians are Sunnis, a lot of these Sunnis are not supporting the rebels but instead side with Assad. (Assad also gets a lot of his support from the minorities, who are Shias, Alawites, Twelvers, Ismailis, Christians, and etc, which in addition to some of the Sunnis give him a somewhat strong support base. )

Now, back to the rebellious heads of our Hydra. I choose to call them rebels rather than “Syrian” “opposition”, because they do not act in unison thus they do not deserve a title that suggests they are singular in mind or action. It also does not seem that they actually have Syria’s best interests in mind, considering they are backed by countries that have their own interests in mind as discussed above.  Currently, this Hydra now has more than 20 heads, all of which seem to agree only on destruction. The stories from the field about the rebels are quite repulsive. They seem to be spending most of their time on creating destruction and chaos, rather than co-operating with each other or thinking about their “grand strategy” for Syria. Unsurprisingly, most of them are not thinking of going to the peace talks, because they don’t want to talk if there is a possibility of Assad remaining in power.
Considering that Assad is doing well military wise and support wise from minorities and some Sunnis ( thus he has some legitimacy – close to 50% of the population), one would think that the rebels would realize that the best way to end violence is to begin talking and eventually develop a compromise. However, a compromise is a non-starter for a lot of rebel groups and some even threaten to severe ties with their fellow rebel groups who attend the peace talks, if the talks focus on compromising with Assad. If the rebels are truly fighting Assad because they want to stop a “blood thirsty monster”, they should jump at the chance to stop the bloodshed. As they are not, it makes you wonder if stopping bloodshed and creating peace is actually something they want.

However, the West chooses to ignore the above mentioned points (of which it is well aware) and strongly supports the rebels. Some intellectuals suggested arming the rebels in order to help them fight Assad, because a Hydra with some[more] firepower will almost certainly bring peace to Syria. Perhaps our super-powered Hydra will destroy Assad’s regimes, but then… we are left one ugly fiery Hydra to deal with! The rebels are already being armed by their home countries, but  the West does not need to contribute to that. Moreover, the guns we give out do not exactly come back to us; instead they contribute to the militarization of and instability in the region – as demonstrated by our experience with Libya, where our arms contributed to militarization of Libya and Niger.

At very least, before providing military support, we should put a leash on this unwieldy monster. We need ensure that there is only one head and it truly desires to act in the best interests of Syrians (SNC is falling apart due to internal disagreements). Furthermore, we need to be thinking about what if our lovely sea monster will turn around and try bite our head off once it gets its steady footing. Meaning, are we alright with the idea of an extremist Islamist government in Syria? Do we believe such a government is the key to a sustainable peace in Syria? We don’t have all of the answers, but we need to get some answers before making any concrete moves military wise.

Indeed, we need to learn from our past failures. In Libya, we flew in, killed Gadaffi and flew out. Now, the country is falling apart at the seams. Lets not get ahead of ourselves and let what happened with Libya, Afghanistan or Iraq happen to Syria. If we think Assad needs to go, we need to have a better plan than just hoping that the rebels will make up, brighten up and lead Syria to a stable peace once we help them to dispose of Assad.

I do realize I did not go into enough depth on a lot of points, because I did not want to make the post too long. Thus I think I’ll write an article on this topic in a month or so… So keep an eye out for that! Also, feel free to posts your thoughts on the complexities in the region or Syria’s situation :)

The Challenges Facing the Haitian National Police force

This is a post about the issues that the HNP is facing today, and how to overcome them. It is also available in slightly different format on http://www.cdainstitute.ca/en/blog/entry/reforming-the-haitian-national-police

In addition, I wrote a more academic article that will elaborate further on this topic:
http://theworldtoday13.blogspot.ca/p/the-road-to-success-challenges.html

Hope you like it! :)

Due to the poverty, in addition to other factors, Haiti’s security environment has been unstable for quite some time. In 1994, Aristide disbanded the Haitian Armed Forces that were guilty of many human rights abuses and created the Haitian National Police (HNP), which is now responsible for police, corrections, fire, emergency response, airport security, port security, and coast guard functions. Next year will be the 20th anniversary of the HNP; unfortunately, during all this time not a lot of progress has been made in reforming the HNP. Moreover, there is talk of withdrawing the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) due to allegations of sexual exploitation and physical abuse of Haitians by the Sri Lankan, Uruguayan, and Brazilian peacekeepers. The Haitian Senate and the people of Haiti are crying out for justice and for the withdrawal of peacekeeping troops. As the UN does not have the authority to prosecute the peacekeepers, it relies on the home countries of the peacekeepers to prosecute. It can only send home the accused peacekeepers. Considering the UN’s inability to punish, the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon recommended to reduce the troops from 6,270 to 5,021 by June 2014.

Thus we need examine what still needs to be done in the HNP reform before the withdrawal of UN troops. The biggest obstacles that stand in the way of the HNP becoming a self-sufficient and responsible force are underfunding, under-resourcing, the internal issues of the HNP and the lack of genuine commitment to the reform on the part of the government.

These issues are all very much interconnected. Due to the government’s lack of political will and dedication to the reform process, the HNP reform is underfunded and the HNP itself is under-resourced. While the government’s annual budget has been increasing in past years, the percentage that is dedicated to the HNP is steadily decreasing – from 5.5% in 2006 to 4.8% in 2011. Since having a secure and stable environment is the main goal of the government, it should ensure the share of the HNP’s budget is growing in proportion with the increase in the government’s annual budget, not decreasing.

Most of the budget dedicated to the HNP is used for the payment of salaries, rather than the actual reform. Since the number of HNP graduates is growing and the HNP’s budget is decreasing, less and less money will be dedicated to the actual reform since the government will need to pay more salaries. Currently, MINUSTAH and bilateral donors such as USA and Canada are dominating the reform of HNP. As a result, many within the government see the reform process as imposed by the external actors, which leads to a lack of local ownership and political commitment. MINUSTAH cannot withdraw when the government is not fully committed to reforming its only security force, since the country’s stability and security would solely depend on the HNP after withdrawal of troops.

In order for the HNP to become a self-sufficient and responsible force, the government needs to shift its main focus from increasing the number of officers to ensuring that it is capable of fully funding and equipping the existing force. Furthermore, the government should focus on finishing the vetting process for the existing police officers (only 4,462 out of 12,678 have been vetted) and ensuring that the end number of officers is not higher than the number it can adequately manage without external help. It is best to have a well-functioning and well-equipped smaller force than larger force that is underequipped, undertrained and underpaid since such a force is more likely to be involved in human rights abuses.

Furthermore, the government needs to address the internal issues of the HNP. The HNP cannot properly function under its current regulatory system, which is composed of outdated and last minute 70 general orders, guidelines and standard operating procedures. A committee should be established to update and harmonize all of them and make sure that they reflect the current realities of the HNP.

Lastly, the hierarchy issues should be addressed. For example, the Inspectorate General, which is responsible for investigating public complaints and human rights violations and assessing the efficiency of the HNP, should be made an independent body. As it stands the Minister of Justice and Public Security, who has the power to dismiss the Inspector General, is also responsible for the functioning of the ministry. Thus the Inspector General has a tricky job of making sure that his recommendations will be acceptable to the Minister, otherwise, it could cost him/her his job. Indeed, the Inspector General has been replaced three times in 2012, which as the United Nations Secretary-General rightly pointes out does “raise questions about the independence and the effectiveness of the oversight body”.

As mentioned, the Government of Haiti has a lot to do before the withdrawal of the peacekeeping force. Since the HNP is clearly unready to take the bulk of the responsibility for security on itself, the government needs to show clear commitment to the reform of HNP and make it number one priority - if it does not want Haiti to fall back into chaos after the withdrawal of the UN troops.

Security Challenges in South Sudan

A post based on my article on the military reform in South Sudan (article cane be viewed here : http://theworldtoday13.blogspot.ca/p/military-reform.html ). So if you don't want to read 20 pg article, this is a good substitute. It is also published on http://www.cdainstitute.ca/en/blog/entry/issues-analysis-security-sector-reform-in-south-sudan .

As the second anniversary of South Sudan’s independence passed on 9 July, the world turned to examine the successes and failures of the new country. Although there are many areas that South Sudan urgently needs to reform, fix or build, the most pressing area is security sector reform (SSR), in particular military reform. The hope is that thanks to SSR, there will be an increase in security and stability in the country, which is needed before tackling areas such as development, infrastructure or social services. Consequently, the main objective of the new nation is to professionalize its over-sized army, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).

The SPLA is largely made up of guerilla fighters, a holdover from the civil war. Due to the mentality of guerrilla fighters, the lack of professional training and hard life, it is not surprising that many SPLA soldiers have been accused of human rights violations. Indeed, in January 2013 Human Rights Watch noted that in a March 2012 disarmament operation in Jonglei SPLA soldiers took part in “extrajudicial killings, severe beatings, tying people up with rope, and submerging their heads in water to extract information about the location of weapons,” and in “sexual violence against women and girls.” Moreover, since the police force currently lacks the capacity to manage internal affairs, the SPLA is often deployed to deal with internal matters during which they use disproportionate force against civilians.

Thus one of the biggest threats to internal security in South Sudan is the SPLA itself. Although the United Nations Mission in South Sudan and other external partners provide training courses on human rights, they will not have the desired effect if the soldiers themselves do not have any respect for human life. In order to combat human rights abuses, the Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs should be put in charge of ensuring SPLA soldiers go through psychological testing in order to make sure that they are mentally fit for military duty. The ones that are deemed unfit should not be passed down to other security services, such the police force, since that will foster further insecurity. Instead, soldiers deemed unfit for duty should be included in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process, which will allow them to build healthy relationships with the community. In addition, DDR will ensure ex-​combatants contribute productively to their communities and provide a disincentive to becoming a militia again.

Starting from the top is not feasible as the SPLA wields a great amount of power over politics, as demonstrated by recent salary increases during harsh economic times. Indeed, any reduction in the size of the SPLA is unlikely to be welcomed by the organization. Consequently, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) needs to appoint officials that would be truly dedicated to the reconstruction of the SPLA.

Military reform in post-​conflict countries is always complicated. However, in order to create a strong state, all security issues need to be addressed before any real steps can be taken to tackle other areas.

Militia, Security and Libya

Since 2011 revolution, Libya’s security environment has been a constant pressing issue. Without a monopoly on the use of force, the new government cannot focus on other issues plaguing the country. At first, the security instability was largely caused by the plethora of militia groups or revolutionary armed groups. However, most of the militia groups are now absorbed into the Supreme Security Committees (SSC) and the Libya Shield, which were created as an effort by the government to bring the militia under its own control. The SSC was meant to act as a supplement to the regular police force and the Libya Shield- as a supplement to the regular army force. Although they are technically under the authority of the Interior Ministry and the chief of staff, the two entities grew to be quite autonomous. Indeed, the subsequent attempts of the Ministry of Interior to integrate the SSC into the regular policy force were met with a lot resistance. This resistance is not surprising since for those at the top of the SSC the integration would mean relinquishing their hard-earned power, while for those at the bottom it would mean a much lower salary. The autonomy and power of these two groups were shown in their May 2013 siege of the ministries, during which they demanded that an isolation law would be passed to prevent those who were serving in government under Qaddafi from any government employment. In addition, they subsequently demanded the resignation of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan.

Thus the number one issue for the post-revolutionary central government is to bring these two government-sponsored militia groups under its full control. The most recent and most promising attempt at this was the idea of a National Guard, which aimed to bring Libya Shield under full government control. Volunteers from the Libya Shield would support the army in protecting the country from external threats and at times helping the police maintain internal security. By creating this new third entity, in addition to regular army and police, the government was hoping to rebrand the Libya Shield militia, which would have moved it further away from revolutionary thinking and closer to nationalist thinking. However, in mid-June, the Zeidan government decided to repeal its resolution 362 to set up a National Guard without a clear explanation. This is an unfortunate decision since it could have ushered a more stable security environment by allowing all forces to work on common goal of protecting the country. Moreover, creating a National Guard out of the existing forces is a better plan of action for a country that has a surplus of militia, than creating a separate Libyan military force from non-soldiers, which is now envisioned by NATO countries.

In order to start ameliorating the security situation, the Zeidan government needs to put SSC members through vetting process and absorb the successful ones into regular police force, while demobilising and disarming those who do not pass the process. Furthermore, it should increase the salaries of the army and police officers in order to appeal to those working for the SSC and the Libya Shield, where salaries are much higher. Since they are also paid by the government, it should be relatively easy for the government to readjust salaries. Moreover, since the army and police forces are bloated at the top ranks, the government needs to free up space in order to show the opportunity for growth and attract more soldiers from the SSC and the Libya Shield. More importantly, the government should create a clearly defined road map for the security sector that will prioritize SSR activities and clarify functions and command authority held by the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, chief of general staff, and military governorships. Indeed, the government should ensure that the reorganization of the oversight bodies of the forces goes hand in hand with any security sector reform since without clear command structure at government level, the SSC and the Libya Shield leaders (and other smaller militia groups) will be hesitant to give up their authority or submit to the Zeidan government.

Mali: Then, Now and the Future

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/opinion/chappatte-cartoon-france-in-mali.html?_r=0

Due to my interest in counter-terrorism, I have found the situation in Mali quite fascinating (and horrible at the same) since the takeover of northern Mali by the Islamist extremists. In this blog, I would like to give a brief background to the situation in Mali, discuss the current situation and give some future projections and suggestions as to how the international community should proceed. I should also mention that I have helped Senator Mobina Jaffer in creating her own blog on this issue, with strong focus on how the situation affected the women in Mali. You can read her blog here: http://www.mobinajaffer.ca/women/resolution-1325-and-the-need-to-empower-malian-women . However, as I have mentioned, I will discuss the situation in Mali in more broad terms. So here we go!

Then

For more than a decade, Mali has been a model democratic nation for the other African countries.  However, in spring of 2012, the situation in Mali took a turn for the worst after the ousting of President Toure by the Tuareg nationalists (also known as MNLA or National Movement of the Liberation of Azawad) with the help of Islamist extremists.  Although MNLA has gained independence of Azawad, they decided to renounce its claim on Azawad due to conflicting aims with the Islamist extremists. Thus northern Mali was left in the hands of the extremists. 

However, one needs to keep in mind that the Islamist extremists were never one unified group. Indeed, they are composed of three groups: Ansar Dine, Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQUIM).  Although they only had loose ties to each other, they all wanted to impose a hard-line form of Sharia - the Saudi-inspired Wahhabi/Salafi sect of Islam. However, the brutality imposed by these extremists should not be blindly accepted as the teachings of Sharia. Indeed, Saran Keita Diakite, president of the Women's Peace and Security network for the West African economic community ECOWAS, explained that: “They cut off people arms and beat up women who have had sex outside marriage ... while they themselves are raping girls and women and are forcing girls to marry. The first night, [the bride] is forced to have sex with five to six men. It's not Sharia."

The international community stood by and watched the horror unfolding in northern Mali… That is not to say that wheels were not turning. For example, in December 2012, UN Security Council passed resolution 2085  that recalled previous resolutions regarding the Northern Mali conflict, resolutions 2056 and 2071, in authorizing action. In addition, according to Ban Ki Moon, it “aimed at the full restoration of Mali’s constitutional order and territorial integrity”. However, as with everything in bureaucracy, and especially international bureaucracy, everything takes time. People in northern Mali did not have any time to spare.

However, the rebel capture of Konna, and the looming takeover of a vital militarily airfield in the town of Sevare (that also had a lot of French citizens), prompted a proactive military intervention by France. French government was also worried that Mali would become the breeding ground for French-Mali jihadists, who would then spread their message to Malian immigrants in France thus they decided to intervene.  Although UNSCR 2085 calls for financial support from Member States, France’s allies were content with just providing some planes and a lot of promises to think about greater contributions. Unfortunately for France, the Islamists extremists vowed to make France pay for their proactive military intervention in Mali. It was said that Algerian gas facility hostage situation was in response to the French first air strikes in Mali. The initial intervention that started on January 11^th looked promising, but the military successes stalled as the extremists turned to guerilla warfare.

Now

France has contributed around 4,000 soldiers to the fight in northern Mali. With the help of 2900 West African soldiers from Chad, Nigeria, Togo, Burkina Faso and Senegal, they have driven out the Islamist extremists out of northern Mali. However, the extremists have retreated into the desert from where they are carrying out guerilla warfare with the French and African forces. Thus far, the invention cost France around 133$m. 

Although French government has been “withdrawing” its forces since March, it is doing so very slowly and most of them are likely to stay at least until July. France has never intended to stay long-term in Mali. It achieved its goals of stopping the advancement of the extremists and freeing northern cities from their rule. It is now focusing on rooting out rebel holdouts and training African troops to take over peacekeeping efforts once the French leave.  

On 25 April 2013, the Security Council adopted resolution 2100 authorizes deployment of a UN force comprising 11,200 military personnel and 1,440 international police, which would take over from and absorb UN African-led mission AFISMA on July 1. However, the newly created UN force MINUSMA will not be authorized to undertake offensive military operations against the extremists, thus it is likely that this function will be carried out by remaining French forces that supposed to dwindle to 1000 troops by the end of the year.

The Future?

The waiting game. The extremists have retreated into the shadows for now, but they are waiting for their chance to reclaim what they have lost. The French politicians are under a lot of pressure to make sure that they do loose the support of the people, which is why they have begun withdrawing their forces. The Member States’ support for MINUSMA will wane with time as well.

 If there aren’t extremists posing a major threat in areas where the UN troops will operate or if international military forces are not conducting major combat operations in those areas, then MINUSMA will take over on July 1. However, what will happen if that is not the case?  French and West African forces will be responsible for carrying out the fighting, until UN deems it safe to go in and set up camp. It is most likely that the extremists do not have the capability or the organization between themselves to organize another major takeover of the area. This means paints a very familiar picture: guerilla warfare against peacekeepers that are not authorized to do much other than defend themselves. 

Making MINUSMA peace enforcers would allow them to use lethal force in serious combat situations, but this is unlikely to fly with some of the permanent Security Council members, such as Russia. On the other hand, MINUSMA is going to be supported by some remaining French troops that will carry out strategic military operations, but will that be enough?? What happens after the French leave and there are still guerilla extremists out there? 

So back to the waiting game, the extremists have all the time in the world to wait compared to UN or France. Political realities for them are quite time constraining. Thus what we need to do is not focus on “stabilizing” the region with peacekeepers, because it will never be stable if the Malians know that the extremists are hiding in the shadows are just waiting for the right moment to strike back. We have to make sure that fear is neutralized, by … well, “neutralizing” the extremists. 

The only way to fight guerilla warfare is by using guerilla warfare (i.e. counterguerilla AND counterinsurgency (COIN) operations – see definitions below). Therefore, there should be dedicated and weighty counterguerilla and COIN units to which enough resources are dedicated to be able to deal with the guerrilla tactics of the extremists. This means that either the French forces should entirely dedicate themselves to this goal or there should be a counterguerilla /COIN unit within MINUSMA. In order to truly to deal with the extremists, counterguerilla/COIN should be the primary goal before any peacekeeping or peacebuilding efforts. Moreover, counter-insurgency effort will not be a short-term affair thus units that can stay in Mali for some time need to be dedicated to the mission. Moreover, West African forces should be trained on counter-insurgency, rather than stabilization or peacekeeping. If they do this, then there will be a smooth transition from counterguerrila efforts carried out by French forces (which they should be doing) to COIN carried out by West African forces. 

It is important to wipe out the extremists as quickly and as efficiently as possible, because time is on their side. If we use conventional military tactics to fight unconventional (guerilla) tactics, it will take a very long time with very few victories for our side. We’ll eventually give up and go home.

In the meantime, radicalization could be in full swing. The instability, fear and broken homes from which the youth will search for something to identify with - such as a sense of purpose and a sense of belonging to a group, which can easily be perverted and manipulated to identify with extremists groups and jihad – will create an environment that will breed ample opportunities for the extremists to radicalize the youth (or not youth). Thus we need act now, and we need to so strategically and swiftly.

Counterguerilla operations - focus on detecting and defeating the armed insurgent or guerrilla, without solving the society’s underlying problems. Military efforts alone, however, cannot defeat an insurgency.

Counterinsurgency (COIN) - involves all political, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological, and civic actions that can be taken by a government to defeat an insurgency. COIN operations include supporting a Host Nation’s military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat an insurgency. Avoiding the creation of new insurgents and forcing existing insurgents to end their participation is vital to defeating an insurgency. COIN operations often include security assistance programs such as foreign military sales programs, the foreign military financing program, and international military training and education programs.

Thoughts on Women in Peacebuilding

I dedicate this post to my brother who annoys me post more frequently :P ! Love you Alex! :)

It is surprising how little media attention is given to the movement for the increase of women's participation in peace-building efforts!

It all started more than decade ago with UNSCR 1325. It and out of itself, the adoption of this resolution by the Security Council was a very important step for women in conflict zones. This resolution was adopted thanks to hard work of women in NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security that began its existence with the purpose of advocating for Security Council resolution on women, peace and security. Today, this NGO works with UN Member States and civil society to help implement UNSCR 1325, and subsequent related resolutions. With such a large mandate, its quite lucky that they are not alone. For example, there is also the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP) that aims to bridge "the gap between policy discussions and implementation and action on the ground on women, peace and security issues."

These NGOs, and others like them, certainly have their hands full: UN Security Council passed other resolutions relating to women and security - UNSCR 1820, UNSCR 1888, and UNSCR 1889. The resolutions gradually build on each other and demonstrate a change in the discourse and in the views of Security Council relating to the subject matter. It is of note that UNSCR 1325 treated women as subjects of security, rather than agents - who can contribute information that would be crucial to success of peace-building efforts. However, with time UNSCRs did start carving out a larger and more active role for women in peace-building processes with the aim to increase the amount of women in the formulation of all peace-building policies, programs, laws and implementations.  NGOs in Africa have used UNSCR 1325 in order to gain access to government leaders and force them to listen to peace-building ideas of women.

It is easy for a North American to underestimate the importance of these resolutions. We live in a society where discrimination is at a much lower level than in developing countries. Imagine that after a brutal conflict in your country, during which you or your family member may have been raped or mutilated, you are not allowed access to the peace-building process where you can share your ideas on how to prevent the atrocities from re-occurring. How awful it must be not to have a voice in that situation? Moreover, the new "government" of your country could be against empowering women. Once they establish control of the country, they may subjugate women even more than they were before - perhaps by installing some sort of hardline Islam law.  This is a real concern for women in Mali. They will loose a lot if the Islamist rebels gain full control of the country. Thus shouldn't Mali women be able to participate in the conflict resolution efforts since they have the most to loose if rebels gain full country of the country? Of course they should! Resolution 1325 allows for that. It requires Member States to involve women in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Hopefully with more media coverage of this issue, Member States will have more incentive to actually abide by the resolution. 

I leave you with this : studies show that post conflict reconstruction efforts have been most successful when there was a large amount of women involved in the process. Thus women can re-shape the world in a positive way, they just need to be given the chance to do so.

Women War Peace: The Politics of Peacebuilding

Three women of international renown share their experience in fostering peace and human rights in Uganda, the Philippines and Colombia in this edition of the Joan B. Kroc Distinguished Lecture Series at the Institute for Peace & Justice at the University of San Diego. Series: "Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice Distinguished Lecture Series"