Militia, Security and Libya

Since 2011 revolution, Libya’s security environment has been a constant pressing issue. Without a monopoly on the use of force, the new government cannot focus on other issues plaguing the country. At first, the security instability was largely caused by the plethora of militia groups or revolutionary armed groups. However, most of the militia groups are now absorbed into the Supreme Security Committees (SSC) and the Libya Shield, which were created as an effort by the government to bring the militia under its own control. The SSC was meant to act as a supplement to the regular police force and the Libya Shield- as a supplement to the regular army force. Although they are technically under the authority of the Interior Ministry and the chief of staff, the two entities grew to be quite autonomous. Indeed, the subsequent attempts of the Ministry of Interior to integrate the SSC into the regular policy force were met with a lot resistance. This resistance is not surprising since for those at the top of the SSC the integration would mean relinquishing their hard-earned power, while for those at the bottom it would mean a much lower salary. The autonomy and power of these two groups were shown in their May 2013 siege of the ministries, during which they demanded that an isolation law would be passed to prevent those who were serving in government under Qaddafi from any government employment. In addition, they subsequently demanded the resignation of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan.

Thus the number one issue for the post-revolutionary central government is to bring these two government-sponsored militia groups under its full control. The most recent and most promising attempt at this was the idea of a National Guard, which aimed to bring Libya Shield under full government control. Volunteers from the Libya Shield would support the army in protecting the country from external threats and at times helping the police maintain internal security. By creating this new third entity, in addition to regular army and police, the government was hoping to rebrand the Libya Shield militia, which would have moved it further away from revolutionary thinking and closer to nationalist thinking. However, in mid-June, the Zeidan government decided to repeal its resolution 362 to set up a National Guard without a clear explanation. This is an unfortunate decision since it could have ushered a more stable security environment by allowing all forces to work on common goal of protecting the country. Moreover, creating a National Guard out of the existing forces is a better plan of action for a country that has a surplus of militia, than creating a separate Libyan military force from non-soldiers, which is now envisioned by NATO countries.

In order to start ameliorating the security situation, the Zeidan government needs to put SSC members through vetting process and absorb the successful ones into regular police force, while demobilising and disarming those who do not pass the process. Furthermore, it should increase the salaries of the army and police officers in order to appeal to those working for the SSC and the Libya Shield, where salaries are much higher. Since they are also paid by the government, it should be relatively easy for the government to readjust salaries. Moreover, since the army and police forces are bloated at the top ranks, the government needs to free up space in order to show the opportunity for growth and attract more soldiers from the SSC and the Libya Shield. More importantly, the government should create a clearly defined road map for the security sector that will prioritize SSR activities and clarify functions and command authority held by the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, chief of general staff, and military governorships. Indeed, the government should ensure that the reorganization of the oversight bodies of the forces goes hand in hand with any security sector reform since without clear command structure at government level, the SSC and the Libya Shield leaders (and other smaller militia groups) will be hesitant to give up their authority or submit to the Zeidan government.

Mali: Then, Now and the Future

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/opinion/chappatte-cartoon-france-in-mali.html?_r=0

Due to my interest in counter-terrorism, I have found the situation in Mali quite fascinating (and horrible at the same) since the takeover of northern Mali by the Islamist extremists. In this blog, I would like to give a brief background to the situation in Mali, discuss the current situation and give some future projections and suggestions as to how the international community should proceed. I should also mention that I have helped Senator Mobina Jaffer in creating her own blog on this issue, with strong focus on how the situation affected the women in Mali. You can read her blog here: http://www.mobinajaffer.ca/women/resolution-1325-and-the-need-to-empower-malian-women . However, as I have mentioned, I will discuss the situation in Mali in more broad terms. So here we go!

Then

For more than a decade, Mali has been a model democratic nation for the other African countries.  However, in spring of 2012, the situation in Mali took a turn for the worst after the ousting of President Toure by the Tuareg nationalists (also known as MNLA or National Movement of the Liberation of Azawad) with the help of Islamist extremists.  Although MNLA has gained independence of Azawad, they decided to renounce its claim on Azawad due to conflicting aims with the Islamist extremists. Thus northern Mali was left in the hands of the extremists. 

However, one needs to keep in mind that the Islamist extremists were never one unified group. Indeed, they are composed of three groups: Ansar Dine, Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQUIM).  Although they only had loose ties to each other, they all wanted to impose a hard-line form of Sharia - the Saudi-inspired Wahhabi/Salafi sect of Islam. However, the brutality imposed by these extremists should not be blindly accepted as the teachings of Sharia. Indeed, Saran Keita Diakite, president of the Women's Peace and Security network for the West African economic community ECOWAS, explained that: “They cut off people arms and beat up women who have had sex outside marriage ... while they themselves are raping girls and women and are forcing girls to marry. The first night, [the bride] is forced to have sex with five to six men. It's not Sharia."

The international community stood by and watched the horror unfolding in northern Mali… That is not to say that wheels were not turning. For example, in December 2012, UN Security Council passed resolution 2085  that recalled previous resolutions regarding the Northern Mali conflict, resolutions 2056 and 2071, in authorizing action. In addition, according to Ban Ki Moon, it “aimed at the full restoration of Mali’s constitutional order and territorial integrity”. However, as with everything in bureaucracy, and especially international bureaucracy, everything takes time. People in northern Mali did not have any time to spare.

However, the rebel capture of Konna, and the looming takeover of a vital militarily airfield in the town of Sevare (that also had a lot of French citizens), prompted a proactive military intervention by France. French government was also worried that Mali would become the breeding ground for French-Mali jihadists, who would then spread their message to Malian immigrants in France thus they decided to intervene.  Although UNSCR 2085 calls for financial support from Member States, France’s allies were content with just providing some planes and a lot of promises to think about greater contributions. Unfortunately for France, the Islamists extremists vowed to make France pay for their proactive military intervention in Mali. It was said that Algerian gas facility hostage situation was in response to the French first air strikes in Mali. The initial intervention that started on January 11^th looked promising, but the military successes stalled as the extremists turned to guerilla warfare.

Now

France has contributed around 4,000 soldiers to the fight in northern Mali. With the help of 2900 West African soldiers from Chad, Nigeria, Togo, Burkina Faso and Senegal, they have driven out the Islamist extremists out of northern Mali. However, the extremists have retreated into the desert from where they are carrying out guerilla warfare with the French and African forces. Thus far, the invention cost France around 133$m. 

Although French government has been “withdrawing” its forces since March, it is doing so very slowly and most of them are likely to stay at least until July. France has never intended to stay long-term in Mali. It achieved its goals of stopping the advancement of the extremists and freeing northern cities from their rule. It is now focusing on rooting out rebel holdouts and training African troops to take over peacekeeping efforts once the French leave.  

On 25 April 2013, the Security Council adopted resolution 2100 authorizes deployment of a UN force comprising 11,200 military personnel and 1,440 international police, which would take over from and absorb UN African-led mission AFISMA on July 1. However, the newly created UN force MINUSMA will not be authorized to undertake offensive military operations against the extremists, thus it is likely that this function will be carried out by remaining French forces that supposed to dwindle to 1000 troops by the end of the year.

The Future?

The waiting game. The extremists have retreated into the shadows for now, but they are waiting for their chance to reclaim what they have lost. The French politicians are under a lot of pressure to make sure that they do loose the support of the people, which is why they have begun withdrawing their forces. The Member States’ support for MINUSMA will wane with time as well.

 If there aren’t extremists posing a major threat in areas where the UN troops will operate or if international military forces are not conducting major combat operations in those areas, then MINUSMA will take over on July 1. However, what will happen if that is not the case?  French and West African forces will be responsible for carrying out the fighting, until UN deems it safe to go in and set up camp. It is most likely that the extremists do not have the capability or the organization between themselves to organize another major takeover of the area. This means paints a very familiar picture: guerilla warfare against peacekeepers that are not authorized to do much other than defend themselves. 

Making MINUSMA peace enforcers would allow them to use lethal force in serious combat situations, but this is unlikely to fly with some of the permanent Security Council members, such as Russia. On the other hand, MINUSMA is going to be supported by some remaining French troops that will carry out strategic military operations, but will that be enough?? What happens after the French leave and there are still guerilla extremists out there? 

So back to the waiting game, the extremists have all the time in the world to wait compared to UN or France. Political realities for them are quite time constraining. Thus what we need to do is not focus on “stabilizing” the region with peacekeepers, because it will never be stable if the Malians know that the extremists are hiding in the shadows are just waiting for the right moment to strike back. We have to make sure that fear is neutralized, by … well, “neutralizing” the extremists. 

The only way to fight guerilla warfare is by using guerilla warfare (i.e. counterguerilla AND counterinsurgency (COIN) operations – see definitions below). Therefore, there should be dedicated and weighty counterguerilla and COIN units to which enough resources are dedicated to be able to deal with the guerrilla tactics of the extremists. This means that either the French forces should entirely dedicate themselves to this goal or there should be a counterguerilla /COIN unit within MINUSMA. In order to truly to deal with the extremists, counterguerilla/COIN should be the primary goal before any peacekeeping or peacebuilding efforts. Moreover, counter-insurgency effort will not be a short-term affair thus units that can stay in Mali for some time need to be dedicated to the mission. Moreover, West African forces should be trained on counter-insurgency, rather than stabilization or peacekeeping. If they do this, then there will be a smooth transition from counterguerrila efforts carried out by French forces (which they should be doing) to COIN carried out by West African forces. 

It is important to wipe out the extremists as quickly and as efficiently as possible, because time is on their side. If we use conventional military tactics to fight unconventional (guerilla) tactics, it will take a very long time with very few victories for our side. We’ll eventually give up and go home.

In the meantime, radicalization could be in full swing. The instability, fear and broken homes from which the youth will search for something to identify with - such as a sense of purpose and a sense of belonging to a group, which can easily be perverted and manipulated to identify with extremists groups and jihad – will create an environment that will breed ample opportunities for the extremists to radicalize the youth (or not youth). Thus we need act now, and we need to so strategically and swiftly.

Counterguerilla operations - focus on detecting and defeating the armed insurgent or guerrilla, without solving the society’s underlying problems. Military efforts alone, however, cannot defeat an insurgency.

Counterinsurgency (COIN) - involves all political, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological, and civic actions that can be taken by a government to defeat an insurgency. COIN operations include supporting a Host Nation’s military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat an insurgency. Avoiding the creation of new insurgents and forcing existing insurgents to end their participation is vital to defeating an insurgency. COIN operations often include security assistance programs such as foreign military sales programs, the foreign military financing program, and international military training and education programs.

Thoughts on Women in Peacebuilding

I dedicate this post to my brother who annoys me post more frequently :P ! Love you Alex! :)

It is surprising how little media attention is given to the movement for the increase of women's participation in peace-building efforts!

It all started more than decade ago with UNSCR 1325. It and out of itself, the adoption of this resolution by the Security Council was a very important step for women in conflict zones. This resolution was adopted thanks to hard work of women in NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security that began its existence with the purpose of advocating for Security Council resolution on women, peace and security. Today, this NGO works with UN Member States and civil society to help implement UNSCR 1325, and subsequent related resolutions. With such a large mandate, its quite lucky that they are not alone. For example, there is also the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP) that aims to bridge "the gap between policy discussions and implementation and action on the ground on women, peace and security issues."

These NGOs, and others like them, certainly have their hands full: UN Security Council passed other resolutions relating to women and security - UNSCR 1820, UNSCR 1888, and UNSCR 1889. The resolutions gradually build on each other and demonstrate a change in the discourse and in the views of Security Council relating to the subject matter. It is of note that UNSCR 1325 treated women as subjects of security, rather than agents - who can contribute information that would be crucial to success of peace-building efforts. However, with time UNSCRs did start carving out a larger and more active role for women in peace-building processes with the aim to increase the amount of women in the formulation of all peace-building policies, programs, laws and implementations.  NGOs in Africa have used UNSCR 1325 in order to gain access to government leaders and force them to listen to peace-building ideas of women.

It is easy for a North American to underestimate the importance of these resolutions. We live in a society where discrimination is at a much lower level than in developing countries. Imagine that after a brutal conflict in your country, during which you or your family member may have been raped or mutilated, you are not allowed access to the peace-building process where you can share your ideas on how to prevent the atrocities from re-occurring. How awful it must be not to have a voice in that situation? Moreover, the new "government" of your country could be against empowering women. Once they establish control of the country, they may subjugate women even more than they were before - perhaps by installing some sort of hardline Islam law.  This is a real concern for women in Mali. They will loose a lot if the Islamist rebels gain full control of the country. Thus shouldn't Mali women be able to participate in the conflict resolution efforts since they have the most to loose if rebels gain full country of the country? Of course they should! Resolution 1325 allows for that. It requires Member States to involve women in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Hopefully with more media coverage of this issue, Member States will have more incentive to actually abide by the resolution. 

I leave you with this : studies show that post conflict reconstruction efforts have been most successful when there was a large amount of women involved in the process. Thus women can re-shape the world in a positive way, they just need to be given the chance to do so.

Women War Peace: The Politics of Peacebuilding

Three women of international renown share their experience in fostering peace and human rights in Uganda, the Philippines and Colombia in this edition of the Joan B. Kroc Distinguished Lecture Series at the Institute for Peace & Justice at the University of San Diego. Series: "Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice Distinguished Lecture Series"

Thoughts on Humanitarian Intervention

The civil conflict in Syria has been highly televised and commented on. The cases for and against intervention have been made by Security Council members, who are very much divided on this issue. This post shall examine the cases for and against humanitarian intervention, in light of the following literature:  Micheal Walzer’s article “The Argument about Humanitarian Intervention”, Micheal Ignatieff’s article “Intervention and State Failure” and Stephen Wertheim’s article “When Humanitarianism Hurts”. After examination of the cases for and against intervention, it will be concluded that international community should (not must) intervene when it believes the outcome of intervention will be positive.

Walzer argues that when it comes to problems international arena, there is “a radical break, a chasm, with nastiness on one side and genocide on the other”. We should intervene when there is a case of genocide or ethnic cleansing. However, we should not intervene to correct “the common brutalities of authoritarian politics”, because in these cases the social change will be best achieved from within. Otherwise, it is likely that the intervention might do more harm than good.  Similarly, Wertheim argues that intervention is only morally permissible when it is actually feasible. If we have enough resources to intervene, before we do so “we must imagine the plausible and probable consequences and plan realistically and far-sightedly”.  He argues that if it is concluded that intervention might do more harm than good, then we must not intervene. Indeed, we can intervene for our benefit rather than the benefit of the victims. For instance, the attempt of intervention makes the interveners feel better about ourselves: they did something to stop the atrocity. However, disregard for consequences of the intervention puts the intervener’s need to be morally blameless above the victims’ actual well-being. Ignatieff has touched on this point in his article. He noted that people in poor countries believe that intervention by the West is often “a lurid exercise in emotional self-gratification” lacking the needed focus on post-reconstruction of conflict area. He highlights that we have “responsibility to follow through”. Once we commit to intervening in conflict, we must provide “sustained follow up”. Thus in the case of Syria, the international community should not intervene without a clear plan for intervention and post-conflict reconstruction and  the strong conviction that the end result would do more good than harm.  Moreover, since the level of violence has not yet reached the level of genocide, it is difficult to claim definitively that military intervention will do more good than harm, in short and/or long term. It is still possible that that fruitful social change can still come from within the country, which would produce better and more long lasting results than any change imposed from outside.

However, international actors should intervene in Syria when the violence and human rights violations reach the level of genocide. If the government begins using chemical weapons, vast amounts of people will be killed which would escalate the current level of violence to the level of genocide. Walzer claims that we have not only a right to act, but an obligation to intervene in this case. If there are risks involved for the intervening state than international actors have a right to respond if they wish, but they are not morally bound to respond. However, he claims that international states have an obligation to intervene, rather than a right, because “the survival of intervening state is not at risk.” Examining the motives of intervening states, he concludes that the intervention is acceptable if intervening state has self-interest in intervening because then it is more likely to actually intervene to stop atrocities. In fact, he argues that “the leaders of states have a right, indeed, they have an obligation, to consider the interests of their own people, even when they are acting to help other people.” However, it could be argued that this statement challenges his earlier claim that states have an obligation to intervene because their survival is not at risk. If he concedes that states have an obligation to consider the interests of their own people when they decided on helping others, then it is possible that the two obligations could be in conflict. Unless there is massive support (majority) for intervention by the citizens of intervening states, then it is possible that intervening states are disregarding their obligation to their citizens. Moreover, solders are duty bound to act in the interest of the security (or in other interest) of their nation. They take an oath to protect their nation. It is morally questionable to require a soldier to be involved in a military confrontation from which his state does not benefit. Perhaps it would be “the right thing to do” for that a state to intervene, but it is possible that it is not morally obligated to do so when the majority of its citizens are not in full support of the intervention. The state has a duty to use its soldiers only for the benefit of the state because those soldiers signed up to protect the state, not the world, and act in the benefit of the state, not in the benefit of the helpless everywhere.

Perhaps it is best to leave the intervention as a right rather than an obligation. If the international community has an obligation to intervene, on top of that it has an obligation to succeed in its intervention and on top of that it has an obligation to provide “sustained follow up”; then the result would be either no one would intervene or almost everyone would “fail”. Thus international community should intervene in Syria only when there is no hope for successful change to come from within the country. In addition, international community should (not must) believe it can stop the conflict successfully and leave the country in better state than it found it in. The decision to intervene should be well thought through, because no victim will say “well, thanks for trying!” when you made their living conditions a lot worse rather than better.

Peacebuilding in Libya

This is an excerpt from an essay I have wrote for one of my classes.  I shall put up the whole essay in a month or so, but this is the most important part of the essay.  This expert examines the peace operations in Libya. .. If anything does not make sense, you are probably lacking context so read the full essay when it's up :p .

 Libya is an interesting case because it is often hailed as a successful peace operation in the media. As you will see below, I agree with this point even though there are still a lot of uncertainties when it comes to Libya's case. P.S. I'll fix the footnotes in a week or so :P And sorry... this is going to be very dry, but in my defense it's an excerpt from an essay and its very hard to make academic writing fun :P .

Image taken from UNSMIL website

The Case of Libya

Peacebuilding

National Transitional Council has been established and recognized as legitimate government by 30 countries even before the end of the war.  Following the declaration of liberation in October 2011, NTC organized a national election of General National Congress on July 7^th, 2012. In October 2012, the GNC elected Ali Zeidan who became the country’s Prime Minister in charge of creating transition coalition government.[1] He chose his government representatives from two biggest blocs in the Congress the Alliance of National Forces, led and the Muslim Brotherhood's Justice and Construction Party. [2] In addition, the GNC will create “constitutional assembly to draft a new constitution which will be submitted to a referendum in 2013.”[3]

Although there have been protests about the make-up of the cabinet, they should be viewed as an acceptable form of voicing ones discontent with political or social issues. The reconstruction of the Libyan political system has been largely positive. Indeed, it met three of the aforementioned requirements of the peacebuilding process: transitional government, elections and elected government. Moreover, there is a lot of internal political support in favour of current political change. For example, the Benghazi part of the February 17^th Coalition, which was part of revolution from the first protest, has decided to dissolve because of “their desire to submit to a single legitimate authority which the NTC represented”.[4] The Coalition refuses to take position of “revolutionary command council”, because they believe that “resort to ‘revolutionary legitimacy’ [might threaten] stability and democratic transformation.”[5] In addition, the Libyan Brotherhood has expressed their support for civil state, democracy or ‘moderate’ Islamic state and civil society. [6] Even the some of the radicals are supporting the regime change. The leader of the Libyan Fighting Group, Bilhaj, has expressed “on numerous political occasions and media appearances his commitment to the establishment of a democratic state, he has recently announced the establishment of the Islamic Movement for Change” that has publicly defended the national political agenda.[7]

 However, it should be noted that security sector reform component of peacebuilding is still incomplete. The NTC had issues imposing its political will because it lacks legitimacy, and therefore it is unable to back its will by force.[8] This will likely change with the newly elected government, but it is too early to say so definitively. Similarly, institutional reform in army, police and judicial sectors in order to achieve “a functioning law enforcement apparatus” has not been yet been achieved for the same reason.

The key issue in security sector is the militias. The local councils that are in charge of administrating cities have military components to them but they do not have full control of those components.[9]  Thus militias are controlling the streets, while not under the control of the government. Indeed, militias never combined into one united force during, or after the conflict, and are now ruling over their own sections of territory thus undermining the authority of the elected government.[10] In addition, the previously mentioned Islamic Movement for Change “has been busy arming itself and forming loyal armed brigades”, while giving a supporting political rhetoric in favour of the regime.[11] Indeed, the security sector disorder has manifested itself in the attack on the US embassy in September, with a result of 4 deaths - one of which was the US ambassador. However, there is hope that with time the elected government will acquire more power and will be able to get the security sector under its control. Indeed, the Libyan people are tired of fighting and want security, which has been demonstrated by the revolt against militias in response to attacks on US embassy.[12] This has given the government the opportunity to “take more concentrated action to consolidate military forces under its command.”[13] One of the ways suggested of reintegrating militias into society is with “a combination of financial rewards, promise of adequate social standing, and above all, assurances that laying down their arms will not jeopardize their safety or that of their community.”[14] However, this can only be done by the elected legitimate government. Indeed, even though there is also still a lot of peacebuilding to be done in economic development, social rehabilitation and regulatory reform, it should be done by the elected government rather than outside forces or foreign diplomats. Otherwise, the process will not to be deemed legitimate and acceptable by the local people.

Currently, UN peacebuilding mission is headed by UN Support Mission in Libya that was created in order to “assist the Libyan authorities to define national needs and priorities throughout Libya, and to match these with offers of strategic and technical advice where appropriate.”[15] It is meant to provide support in the following areas: democratic transition, Rule of Law & Human Right, Security Sector Reform, International Assistance Coordination and countering of illicit proliferation of arms. If UNSMIL follows its mandate closely, then it will be a positive force in Libya. However, it must be careful not to highjack the transition and state-building process from the Libyan people and government in order to install the Western values. If the Libyan people believe that changes in their political system are coming from outside, then they will be less likely to trust it and more likely to rebel against it.

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[1] World Bank, Libya Overview, Sep. 2012, 10 Dec.2012 <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/libya/overview>.

[2] BBC News, Libyan Parliament Approves New Government, 13 Oct.2012, 10 Dec.2012 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20152538>.

[3] World Bank, Libya Overview, Sep. 2012, 10 Dec.2012, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/libya/overview>.

[4] Ibid. 17.

[5] Ibid. 17.

[6] Ibid. 17.

[7] Ibid. 19.

[8] Youssef Mohammad Sawani, “Post-Qadhafi Libya: Interactive Dynamics and the Political Future,” Contemporary Arab Affairs, 5:1 (2012): 9.

[9] Ibid. 16.

[10] Christopher S. Chivvis, Keith Crane, Peter Mandaville, Jeffrey Martini, “Libya’s Post- Qaddafi Transition: The Nation-Building Challenge,” RAND Corporation (2012): 4.

[11] Ibid. 19.

[12] Ibid. 3.

[13] Ibid. 5.

[14] Ibid. 6.

[15] UNSMIL, UNSMIL Mandate, 10 Dec.2012 <http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3544&language=en-US>.