South Sudan: Next Steps?

Brief Overview of the Current Situation

In a Nutshell: political rivals agitated ethnic tensions in order to gather support for their side/cause and it all resulted in ethnic cleansing. Such moves are a very common occurrence in Africa. Considering the fact that  the ethnic tensions existed in South Sudan for decades, if not centuries,  the current situation is hardly surprising.

What Happened : On the national level, there are two main players: President Salva Kiir vs. the former Vice-President Riek Machar. Kiir is from the Dinka tribe, while Machar is from the Nuer tribe. In a press conference on 6 December, 2013 Machar publicly accused the President of dictatorial tendencies. On 15 December, 2013, in-fighting occurred between the Presidential Guard, which Kiir described as an attempted coup d’état perpetrated by forces allied with Machar.  Machar dismissed the accusation as a pretext for Kiir to get rid of the political opposition and fled. Soon the infighting spread throughout SPLA, which effectively split into those siding with Kiir and those siding with Machar. Both sides committed grave human rights abuses. On 21 December, Machar told the press that he was in rebellion against the Government[1]

Now, the Nuer militia that support Machar is called the White Army or the SPLM/A in Opposition. It seems these men seem to be more driven by ethnic hatred, rather than politics. The peace talks are currently a majestic failure, as neither leader is actually interested in making any concessions because they both desire total political control. However, even if Kiir and Machar did come to some kind of a political agreement, it makes one wonder if the ethnic violence would just stop. It seems as that it spiraled out of the control of either leader.

Some Background: During the Second Sudanese Civil War, Macher and his Lou Nuer allies, revolted against Garang's SPLM/A and formed a splinter group - the South Sudan Defence Force. They eventually re-joined the SPLM/A, but Lou Nuer's "treachery" still plays a big part in the conflict between South Sudan’ tribal communities. Thus the speed with which the infighting has spread throughout the SPLM is not surprising since the division within it was stark and had existed for a long time.

Ethnic Tensions: It is also important to remember that South Sudan has many ethnic groups that often have deadly disagreements - usually over land/pastures. Indeed, there are more than 60 ethnic groups in South Sudan. The Dinka is the largest ethnic group, making up 35% of the total population, while the Nuer group is about half the size. It makes sense for the political leaders from these tribes to incite “us vs. them” mentality, because it diverts the attention of the ethnic group from their own leader and his intentions to “them”.

The current conflict is happening against the background of  longstanding ethnic tensions within South Sudan. One of the causes for those tensions is the competition over land and pastures. Since climate is changing, the competition over pastures is increasing and becoming more deadly. Inter-tribal conflicts arise when pastoralists from one tribe enter the territory of another. In addition, conflicts between farmers and cattle-keepers are a recurring problem. These problems have been going on for decades, if not centuries. Cattle raiding and reprisals have been a part of life for generations between the Nuer, Dinka and Murle tribes. Raids are undertaken to increase stocks and to compensate for those lost. At this point, these thefts are accepted as part of daily life and contribute to culture of retaliation/vengeance between the tribes. Since South Sudan's independence in 2011, ethnic violence and cattle raiding have been on the rise - usually the clashes were between the members of the Murle tribe and the Nuer tribe. Thus the current conflict between the Nuer and the Dinka adds a whole new level of complexity to the situation. Thus the solution to current ethnic conflict will be intertwined with the solution to the pastoral conflicts.

Competition over Oil: I should also mention the current struggle over the oil resources: oil=money=power. Machar wants to cut of Kiir from the oilfields and thus economically undermine him. So, understandably, Machar is against the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (that consists of neighbouring states) sending in forces to protect Kiir's oilfields. At this time, the first monitoring and verification team was deployed to Jonglei state capital Bor on 1 April, followed by a second team, which was deployed to Unity state’s Bentiu on 5 April. They are charged with "assessing, monitoring, investigating, verifying and reporting allegations of violations against the cessation of hostilities".

South Sudan and the Neighbours

South Sudan is surrounded by CAR (resource rich but unexploited), Uganda (resource rich), Sudan, Kenya (resource rich) and Ethiopia (resource rich). Once the conflict started and people started fleeing, the neighbouring countries were flooded by refugees – around 254k of them.

Uganda is pushing the refugees into settlements or camps, which can be expensive for Uganda and dangerous for the refugees. Uganda is also fully supporting Kiir: it sent thousands of troops to South Sudan to protect some of the installations in South Sudan, but then it joined government forces in the fight against Machar's forces. Machar naturally protests Uganda’s involvement in South Sudan and its inclusion as an observer in IGAD led peace talks. Machar threatens to boycott the upcoming peace talks in Ethiopia if Uganda takes part in them as an observer. Since Uganda is clearly not impartial, the rebels believe that it should simply join Kiir’s negotiating team.

Sudan has an adversarial history with South Sudan, the country that gained independence from it in 2011. However, it is providing some diplomatic support to South Sudan in this crisis. South Sudan arrested eleven officials from the SPLM  that it did not want to participate in the peace talks and Sudan did say that it will support South Sudan in not allowing these officials to participate in the talks, even if Uganda does not withdraw its forces. So even though Sudan was at first against Ugandan force being in South Sudan, it has soften its stance. Seven  of the eleven officials in question have been released.They are now located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, where the peace talks are taking place. Four are waiting trial for treason. 

Ethiopia is taking in refugees as well. There are about 85 000 refugees at the Ethiopia- South Sudan border. However, the conditions in these camps are poor as the camps are grossly over-crowded: holding sometimes twice the amount of people than they are meant to accommodate.

Ethiopia is also accusing Eritrea for having a hand in the current South Sudan conflict and for supporting Kiir’s forces. Relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia have been adversarial since Eritrea won its independence from Ethiopia in 1991, after 30 years of war. For its part, Eritrea claims that it is acting in hopes of promoting peace and stability in the region. Kenya, another neighbour of South Sudan, supports Eritrea’s rhetoric and looks to deepen its relationship with that state.

Kenya and Ethiopia oppose to the presence of Ugandan troops in South Sudan believe that their presence threatens regional peace and stability.

Another South Sudan’s neighbour is Central African Republic (CAR). Its current security situation is just as alarming as the one in South Sudan, if not more. Some analysts warn that the current crisis in CAR, which started in December 2012, has the possibility of repeating the history of Rwandan genocide. The situation then reversed in the country as Christian militias took power and started targeting Muslim minority, which lead to thousands of deaths, 650k internal displacements, and 290k refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries.

Next Steps

If the issue is elites' struggle for power (which I think it is, but it’s a debatable point) than the international community should resolve the situation in a decisive manner. This leaves little room for power-sharing, which is usually international community’s go-to solution to every power struggle. However, since Kiir and Machar were not able to successfully share power, there is little likelihood that they will be able to do so in the future or that the resulting government with two warring factions will be able to function. 

A better resolution to the conflict is to elect another government that is more representative of the different sections of society and work on local conflict resolution and reconciliation. It is important to take Kiir and Machar out of the picture as the current conflict is almost intimately linked to them. It is unlikely that the Nuer people will allow Kiir to govern in peace after this conflict, even if he did win the elections – and the Dinka will not allow Machar to govern.  This does not mean that once Kiir and Machar are out of the picture that the conflict will end. However, the conflict is more likely to cool down if the agitators were not inciting further violence.  Kiir should be pressured to resign by the international community or the people of South Sudan. Neither Kiir nor Machar should be allowed to run again – I am not sure how this could be accomplished, but since both are guilty of inciting human rights abuses  it should not be too hard for the South Sudan's Supreme Court to rule on.

Interim government should be established to fill the power vacuum.  It should busy itself with diffusing ethnic tensions. First of all, the interim government needs to attempt Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) + Reconciliation . This step will be next to impossible since the rebels (the Nuer) will not want to disarm without fully knowing they will not be retaliated against by the Dinka. Unless, one reorganizes DDR.  First, international community would send in its peacekeeping troops to prevent retaliation and foster security. Second, interim government should work on creating the mechanisms for reconciliation in order to combat the culture of vengeance. These mechanisms have to ensure that people feel that their suffering is recognized. It is important to remember that reconciliation cannot be based on retribution. It should be based on forgiveness and the desire for a better future. The reasoning behind this is that when ethnic cleansing takes place and human rights abuses are committed on the same scale by both sides, it is hard to pin point the perpetrators and “eye for an eye” mentality just makes more opportunities for vengeance.Third, soldiers should be re- integrated into the society, which will make it easier to accomplish the fourth step demobilization and disarmament, that is disbandment and disarmament of armed groups . It is easier to give up the arms if first you have a good vision for a different future i.e a good civilian job. 

Next, the new government has to tackle the underlining issues for ethnic tensions.To deal with the cattle raids and  inter-tribal tensions, I propose a police task force that is made up of individuals from different tribes. This task force would patrol the areas where cattle raids are most frequent. They would also investigate cattle raids. The cattle police task force will not in and out of itself solve the problem of cattle raids, however, with luck, it might discourage the victims taking the matters into their own hands and retaliating. Granted, the police force will have to be just and efficient or it will likely to create more problems than solve.

Another way to help alleviate tensions between tribes would be to create development projects that also involve individuals from different tribes. By working together on a common project, the people from different tribes would form positive connections and relationships. It will hopefully help discourage the demonization of the other tribes and contribute to more peaceful relations. Projects that create inter-dependence between tribes will also be highly valuable in this context as they will also discourage violence. It is unwise to cause harm to those on whom you depend.

The new government should actively encourage peaceful relations between different tribes. It should have an active media campaign to bring to light the similarities between tribes, to encourage peaceful resolution of disputes, and to highlight inter-dependencies  The government leaders need to stop encouraging ethnic tensions and contribute to their resolution.

Furthermore, the leaders need to be convinced by international community that having a more peaceful society is in their interest. They will incite violence only if they believe that it is more beneficial for them. War and conflict has to be made too costly for the leaders. 

However, only the South Sudanese can actually make a lasting change.  They can begin by not killing the members of the rivaling tribe in retaliation. International community needs to step in to provide basic security, but the rest is up to the people. If the people realize that the killing is perpetrated by armed groups and not normal people of other tribe, they could stop the senseless and endless cycle of violence. If the Dinka in the SPLA  tarted the killing, then the Nuer should have retaliated against only the Dinka in the SPLA, not all Dinka people. The people should not allow themselves to get caught up in political rivalries. Better yet, the average Dinka and Nuer should band together in times such as these and retaliate against the SPLA, Kiir and Machar.

Lastly, Uganda needs to withdraw its forces. It says that it will withdraw the forces once the IGAD stabilization force arrives. Hopefully, it will be so. It is very problematic that Uganda supports Kiir since it basically involves itself in an ethnic cleansing within the territory of another country.  Also, if a Nuer was ever elected as a president of South Sudan, it could lead to tensions between the two countries.  However, getting involved in each other’s internal affairs is common for the countries in this part of the world. Very often one country will support the rebels fighting the government in another country. It is hard for anyone, except the leaders of those countries, to do something about this issue. The leaders need to understand and believe that stability in the region depends on them working together rather than fighting and trying to undermine each other....

 I have a dream… 

Further information on the current situation in South Sudan, please check out the following report by International Crisis Group:

South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name

Good short video on internal politics within SPLM that play a large part in the current conflict

 

Life in the DRC - Local Focus

In this post, I will analyze the conflict in the DRC on the local level.

Background - This background is somewhat of a summary of an excellent book called The Trouble with the Congo by Séverine Autesserre. The main message of the book is to point out the failures of UN in the DRC, which I will not get into. However, I did think her well-rounded description of the historical issues in the DRC is a good start for my conflict analysis. But, you can skip down to more present-day analysis. J So here we go!

The DRC is one of those ill-fated countries that has not known peace for many decades.  Indeed, in the 90’s, the DRC has been through two wars. However, the DRC's issues have started at least in 1930’s when the Belgians sent tens of thousands of Rwandans to work for the plantations in the Kivus provinces. Since the Congolese chiefs allowed Belgians to bring the Rwandans only on the condition that they would not have any political rights, the Rwandans were left with a very ambiguous political status. In particular, they were denied indigenous status, which would allow them to own land. However, the Belgians did put a disproportionate amount of Rwandans into local administration, to the dismay of the Congolese.  This added fuel to fire as there were already issues with land availability.

Land was awarded by the local chiefs to those who had an indigenous status, which again Rwandans did not.  Land issue became more prominent in 60s-70s when thousands of Rwandan Tutsis fled to the Kivus in order to escape the prosecution in Rwanda. The tensions increased further when Rwandan Hutus fled to the Kivus because of 1994 Rwandan genocide.  Soon after, in 1996, the 1^st Congo War began, which was closely followed by the 2^nd Congo War in 1998.  The close proximity of the wars is not surprising, considering that the 2nd Congo War started in large part because of President’s Kabila alienation of his Rwandan and Ugandan war allies and the expulsion of their force from the DRC after the 1st war.[1] Although the wars have technically ended, the DRC has not enjoyed a period of peace since then.

On the local level, one of the prominent issues is the lack of land. Consequently, land disputes happen often and usually turn violent and deadly.  In 1973, Mobutu passed a General Property Law that nationalized all land thus taking power away from the chiefs, who usually handed it out. Furthermore, a lot of young peasants were deprived of the access to land due to this law. As a result, their survival opportunities decreased and tensions increased at the local level, which lead to small scale violence.

In the late 80’s, tensions began brewing between the Congolese Hutus and the Congolese Tutsis of Rwandan descent because the Hutus who came to the Kivus tried to affirm their power and diminish the Tutsi influence. As the Rwandan Hutu refugees arrived in 1994, the Rwandan Tutsis in the DRC feared that they would be attacked as their ethnic kin were in Rwanda.  At the same time, the Congolese radicalized against all Rwandans. They blamed Rwandan ethnic tensions for increasing violence in the DRC in general, in addition to already existing land and political disagreements they had with Congolese of Rwandan descent.  All of these tensions over time blew up into a 1996 war.

During the war, the militias switched alliances as it served their needs. Some militia groups fragmented and began fighting each other.  All of the fighting reinforced local tensions, led to militarization of some and decentralised others as militias followed their own local agendas, most notably in South Kivu, North Katanga, and Ituri. However, in general, militias rarely fought with each other and instead targeted unarmed civilians to gain power by either preventing them from collaborating with other groups or punishing those who have done so.

Local

The violence in the South and North Kivu has existed for decades. A lot of it is driven by the competition over land. Since local administration and central governance is weak at best, the local chiefs fill the power vacuum. Even today, they play a prominent role when it comes to the distribution of land. However, they have been losing the support of local populations due to their involvement in patronage and sales of communal land without informing the communities.[2] Although their authority is now often questioned, there is little help for the locals from elsewhere. Indeed, even though the tribunals for land disputes are accessible, the hierarchy between them is not clearly defined, which results in of the tribunals’ overruling of each other’s decisions. [3] Naturally, this uncertainty in the rulings creates tension, which again tends to turn into violence over time.

Perhaps more importantly, there are different laws that apply to resolving land disputes and they often contradict each other. For instance, the Constitution gives investment rights to Congolese and foreigners, while the Agriculture Law states that only the ethnically Congolese people may own land.[4] Furthermore, land governance framework is in disarray. There is a multitude of systems, such as “a statutory land system, customary systems and informal governance practices” that oversee the access and the use of land. [5] There is not much harmonization among the systems, which tends to lead to conflicts when one system is pitted against another in a land dispute.

All of these issues are further complicated by the inter-ethnic competition. Since there is limited arable land, land conflicts are prominent in heavily populated areas. They often turn violent. This problem is intensified by massive displacement caused by armed groups activities or clashes with the army. In South Kivu, a lot of pastoralists are Tutsi Banyamulenge (Congolese of Rwandan descent) who often dispute with customary chiefs and farmers over land use. Pastoralists need the land for their cattle to graze on, which at least partially destroys farmers (usually ethnic Congolese) crops. Unfortunately, due to ethnic competition the land disputes often involve armed groups, and consequently, violence and death.[6] An example of a land dispute can be found in the Ruzizi plain, which is located between at the border of South Kivu and Burundi. There, the disputes between the Barundi (20% of population) and the Bafuliro (80% of population) communities about land and traditional leadership have long ended up in violence.[7]  In 2010, the chefferie (mainly made of those from the Bafuliro community) has created its own security force, the FALL armed group, to protect the Bafuliro from the Forces democratiques pour la liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) when the DRC Armed Forces (FARDC) were unable to do so. Unfortunately, the FALL quickly became predatory and began imposing “taxes” and demanding payoffs at checkpoints from the population.[8] This brings us to the next prominent local issue, the armed groups.

Armed Groups

Although not all of the armed groups are local, all of them do have local implications: massive displacement and insecurity. Before entering the analysis of the armed groups in the DRC, one should place oneself in the shoes of the local population. Massive insecurity that stems from inter-ethnic conflict, predatory armed forces, vicious armed groups, and incompetent government creates an environment of desperate people in desperate situations. This is important to keep at the back of one’s mind especially when analyzing armed groups. In particular, it is important to consider when thinking about disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration in the DRC, or elsewhere really.

For the past two years, the FARDC was actively engaged in fighting with the armed group called the Mouvement du 23 mars (M23). The group officially surrendered and signed an agreement with the government in mid-December 2013, after robust operations against it by the FARDC and MONUSCO in October 2013.[9] M23 are former members of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), who turned against the government due to the poor conditions in the army and the government's unwillingness to implement the 23 March 2009 peace deal. M23 was supported by Rwanda and Uganda in 2012, especially in the offensives that led to capture of a very commercially active city, Goma.[10] However, in 2013 support from Uganda weaned, mostly likely due to international pressure and the lack of a strong incentive that Rwanda continued to have .[11] Indeed, the support from the Government of Rwanda continued mostly likely because M23 aimed to overthrow the government, and extremely resource poor country such as Rwanda could have substantially benefited from having a friendly indebted-to-it DRC government that would oversee an immensely resource rich territory.  Indeed, M23 recruited a lot of demobilized Rwandan soldiers and received support from Rwandan officers, who helped to prevent those soldiers from returning home.[12] However, when internal division within M23 began, Rwandan officials decided to support the new leader because they began to feel that they could not control the original leader Ntaganda and his network. This development is understandable since there isn't much use for Rwanda to help install a new government in the DRC that it would not be able to control.  The internal division within M23, however, weakened it, which eventually lead to its defeat.[13]

As for financing, M23 taxed commercial trucks, from $200 to $1000 per truck that crossed its checkpoints at Kibumba and Kiwanja in North Kivu. In Goma, they looted more than $3million.[14] Other armed groups, such as the FDLR, are involved in gold mining to finance their activities. The FDLR operates in Lubero Territory in North Kivu. While in Walikale, gold mines are controlled by Ria Mutomboki and Mai Mai Simba armed groups.[15] In Orientale Province, Mai Mai Morgan group robbed miners of their cold.[16]  All of these “financing” activities have naturally contributed to the insecurity in the region, human rights violations, and displacement. Indeed, the armed groups often engage in forced recruitment, child recruitment, killings, lootings, abductions, sexual violence, and other human rights violations.[17] The armed forces were responsible for at least 135 cases of rapes from 20 to 30 November 2012 in the South Kivu.[18] The displacement of people has reached astonishing heights: in December 2013, Secretary General stated that 2.7 million people have been internally displaced within the DRC.[19] Thus for the locals, the picture is quite bleak all around. Inter-ethnic tensions, violence perpetrated by the armed groups and the armed forces, and  a distrust in the protection provided by the law are daily realities of those living in the DRC.

Recommendations

In order to move towards peace in the DRC, land issues need to be solved. The starting point for this should be the harmonization of the laws that deal with land disputes, usage or ownership.  Indeed, a new Agricultural Law should be passed that will be the ultimate authority on land issues and that will override parts of any other legal statues that deal with issues relating to land. The law should state all of the relevant information about owning land, using it or resolving conflicts in regards to it. It should clearly define and limit the powers of local chiefs.  It should also describe the process one should go through in order to get a hearing at a tribunal and identify a higher authority which to address when looking to for an appeal. 

That being said, one tribunal should not have the legal authority to overrule the decision of another tribunal. If one of the parties goes to another tribunal to get a more favourable ruling than the other party could present documents that the case has already been tried previously and the party that tried to launch a new case should have to pay a fee for trying to abuse the justice system. However, an entity should exist that would hear the appeals that originate from the tribunals’ rulings.  It is essential that the legal framework is not only organized, but that there is a clear hierarchy within the system, where only one entity exists per each level.  Furthermore, the land governance framework also needs to be streamlined as the current multitude of systems, practices and institutional frameworks (such a statutory land system, customary systems and a variety of informal land governance practices) creates conflicts since two people can claim rights for the same land under two different systems. The legal and land governance system should be publicized heavily by every institution (UN, NGOs, all of the government institutions) in the local languages thus spreading the knowledge as widely as possible. If knowledge is power, the DRC needs to limit the concentration of power at the hands of the few (i.e. chiefs).

A harder issue to address is the issue of armed groups. It is important to remember that often the “recruited” people have been either forced or dubbed into joining the group with a promise of pay or better life.  People in the DRC are desperate people in desperate circumstances. Always fearing for your life, never having enough to eat, being constantly immersed in violence and seeing all of the problems being solved with guns will make anyone want to pick up a gun in order to give oneself and/or his family a fighting chance.  No one likes feeling powerless.

Thus the the DRC government and UN need to focus on changing the structures that form the desperate circumstances rather than focusing on chasing down the armed groups.  As long as the desperate circumstances exist, desperate people will exist as well… and so will the armed groups. In order to change the structures which create the desperate circumstances, the government needs to begin by fixing their legal system, starting with the harmonization of the land laws and land governance systems in particular, and the legal system in general. With a clearly defined laws and legal system, a just application of the law will be easier – although granted, it will probably take decades for the application to get in the proximity of just (due to the level of corruption), but you have to start somewhere.

---

[1] Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 194

[2] "Dealing With Land Issues and Conflict in Eastern Congo: towards an integrated and participatory approach". Report on Seminar held in Brussels on 20-21 September 2012, 4

[3] Ibid 3

[4] Ibid 3

[5] Ibid 3

[6] Ibid 6

[7]" Understanding Conflict in Eastern Congo: The Ruzizi Plain", International Crisis Group, Africa Report #206, 23 July 2013 http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/206-comprendre-les-conflits-dans-lest-du-congo-i-la-plaine-de-la-ruzizi.pdf  p1

[8] Ibid 11

[9] http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/757 p4

[10] http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Uganda--Rwanda-helped-M23---UN-report/-/688334/1636598/-/105wvv7z/-/index.html

[11] Expert Group on the DRC - S/2013/433- http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/433 p4

[12] Ibid

[13] Ibid 6

[14] Ibid

[15] Ibid 35

[16] Ibid

[17] Secretary General Report on the DRC -S/2013/388 - http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/388 p.28

[18] Expert Group on the DRC - S/2013/433- http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/433 p.29

[19]Secretary General Report on the DRC- S/2013/757- http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/757 p6

Syria: It's more complicated than you think.

And yet again a conflict in the Middle East consumes most of the media attention... The crisis in Syria is a very complicated issue, the resolution of which is much more elusive than is portrayed by the 2 minute media segments. Indeed, it is more complicated than most people realize. In this post I would like to point out some of the complexities of the Syrian crisis, in particular the complexities of the two sides.

Side A: Assad’s regime. He is not the most popular fellow in the Western media. His regime has allegedly killed over 100 000 people; although, it is quite likely that the rebels have greatly contributed to that number in same indiscriminate manner. Assad also allegedly used chemical weapons against civilians, although no one ever actually given any proof of that. This accusation painfully reminds me of similar accusations that USA has made when it came to Iraq (Sadam Hussein and his alleged nuclear weapons). However, it should be pointed out that Assad’s regime has been quite cooperative with the demands of the international community. Assad has cooperated with the UN on the chemical weapons issue, and he is open to attending Geneva 2 peace talks. Of course, he does not consider his resignation as a possible option, but he is open to discussing other options (which he does not really need to since his troops have been doing pretty well on the ground. Furthermore, the rebels have been losing the territories they gain due to lack of people’s support in those areas.)

Assad’s regime is supported by Russia, China, and Iran. Russia supports Assad’s regime because of their economic ties (arms exports and major investments in Syria's infrastructure); plus Russia worries about the spread of Islamic militancy in the region – which is very likely if the rebels win. Iran needs Syria to balance against Saudi Arabia and USA. Since USA took out two of its neighbours -Afghanistan and Iraq- and since Iran sits in between them, it rightly feels a bit uncomfortable at this point thus it needs Syria. Furthermore, Assad’s regime is mostly Alawites, which is a Shiite offshoot. Since Iran population is mostly Shiite Muslims, there are also religious ties/loyalties. As for China, it was Syria's third-largest importer in 2010; thus it has some economic interests, plus, for obvious reasons, it wants to discourage the liberal intervention theory that allows other countries to meddle in the internal affairs of nations. Now to the other side, which is favoured by the West.

Side B: the rebels or the opposition, which vaguely reminds me of the Lernaean Hydra - lots of heads none of which are of much use. The Hydra’s body, that gives rise to the numerous heads, consists of three main regional actors: Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Acting in clumsy unison, this beast does not have its heart (or heads) set on peaceful and functioning Syria.

Why? Well, Turkey (and USA for that matter) has long disliked Iran, who has close friendly relations with Syria. If Syria is to fall, Iran becomes more vulnerable . As an added bonus, Turkey will be able to take a bite out of a fallen or weakened Syria (more land for Turkey = possible revival of Ottoman Empire in their eyes?). Furthermore, religious (Wahhabi sect of Islam as the state religion – it is an ultra-conservative branch of Sunni Islam) Qatar and Saudi Arabia also have something to gain – a fall of secular government in the region. Thus it is not surprising that the majority of rebel groups are extreme Islamists that would like the Muslim Brotherhood (Sunni) to take power in Syria (which has not worked out well for Egypt thus far). Although the majority of the Syrians are Sunnis, a lot of these Sunnis are not supporting the rebels but instead side with Assad. (Assad also gets a lot of his support from the minorities, who are Shias, Alawites, Twelvers, Ismailis, Christians, and etc, which in addition to some of the Sunnis give him a somewhat strong support base. )

Now, back to the rebellious heads of our Hydra. I choose to call them rebels rather than “Syrian” “opposition”, because they do not act in unison thus they do not deserve a title that suggests they are singular in mind or action. It also does not seem that they actually have Syria’s best interests in mind, considering they are backed by countries that have their own interests in mind as discussed above.  Currently, this Hydra now has more than 20 heads, all of which seem to agree only on destruction. The stories from the field about the rebels are quite repulsive. They seem to be spending most of their time on creating destruction and chaos, rather than co-operating with each other or thinking about their “grand strategy” for Syria. Unsurprisingly, most of them are not thinking of going to the peace talks, because they don’t want to talk if there is a possibility of Assad remaining in power.
Considering that Assad is doing well military wise and support wise from minorities and some Sunnis ( thus he has some legitimacy – close to 50% of the population), one would think that the rebels would realize that the best way to end violence is to begin talking and eventually develop a compromise. However, a compromise is a non-starter for a lot of rebel groups and some even threaten to severe ties with their fellow rebel groups who attend the peace talks, if the talks focus on compromising with Assad. If the rebels are truly fighting Assad because they want to stop a “blood thirsty monster”, they should jump at the chance to stop the bloodshed. As they are not, it makes you wonder if stopping bloodshed and creating peace is actually something they want.

However, the West chooses to ignore the above mentioned points (of which it is well aware) and strongly supports the rebels. Some intellectuals suggested arming the rebels in order to help them fight Assad, because a Hydra with some[more] firepower will almost certainly bring peace to Syria. Perhaps our super-powered Hydra will destroy Assad’s regimes, but then… we are left one ugly fiery Hydra to deal with! The rebels are already being armed by their home countries, but  the West does not need to contribute to that. Moreover, the guns we give out do not exactly come back to us; instead they contribute to the militarization of and instability in the region – as demonstrated by our experience with Libya, where our arms contributed to militarization of Libya and Niger.

At very least, before providing military support, we should put a leash on this unwieldy monster. We need ensure that there is only one head and it truly desires to act in the best interests of Syrians (SNC is falling apart due to internal disagreements). Furthermore, we need to be thinking about what if our lovely sea monster will turn around and try bite our head off once it gets its steady footing. Meaning, are we alright with the idea of an extremist Islamist government in Syria? Do we believe such a government is the key to a sustainable peace in Syria? We don’t have all of the answers, but we need to get some answers before making any concrete moves military wise.

Indeed, we need to learn from our past failures. In Libya, we flew in, killed Gadaffi and flew out. Now, the country is falling apart at the seams. Lets not get ahead of ourselves and let what happened with Libya, Afghanistan or Iraq happen to Syria. If we think Assad needs to go, we need to have a better plan than just hoping that the rebels will make up, brighten up and lead Syria to a stable peace once we help them to dispose of Assad.

I do realize I did not go into enough depth on a lot of points, because I did not want to make the post too long. Thus I think I’ll write an article on this topic in a month or so… So keep an eye out for that! Also, feel free to posts your thoughts on the complexities in the region or Syria’s situation :)

The Challenges Facing the Haitian National Police force

This is a post about the issues that the HNP is facing today, and how to overcome them. It is also available in slightly different format on http://www.cdainstitute.ca/en/blog/entry/reforming-the-haitian-national-police

In addition, I wrote a more academic article that will elaborate further on this topic:
http://theworldtoday13.blogspot.ca/p/the-road-to-success-challenges.html

Hope you like it! :)

Due to the poverty, in addition to other factors, Haiti’s security environment has been unstable for quite some time. In 1994, Aristide disbanded the Haitian Armed Forces that were guilty of many human rights abuses and created the Haitian National Police (HNP), which is now responsible for police, corrections, fire, emergency response, airport security, port security, and coast guard functions. Next year will be the 20th anniversary of the HNP; unfortunately, during all this time not a lot of progress has been made in reforming the HNP. Moreover, there is talk of withdrawing the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) due to allegations of sexual exploitation and physical abuse of Haitians by the Sri Lankan, Uruguayan, and Brazilian peacekeepers. The Haitian Senate and the people of Haiti are crying out for justice and for the withdrawal of peacekeeping troops. As the UN does not have the authority to prosecute the peacekeepers, it relies on the home countries of the peacekeepers to prosecute. It can only send home the accused peacekeepers. Considering the UN’s inability to punish, the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon recommended to reduce the troops from 6,270 to 5,021 by June 2014.

Thus we need examine what still needs to be done in the HNP reform before the withdrawal of UN troops. The biggest obstacles that stand in the way of the HNP becoming a self-sufficient and responsible force are underfunding, under-resourcing, the internal issues of the HNP and the lack of genuine commitment to the reform on the part of the government.

These issues are all very much interconnected. Due to the government’s lack of political will and dedication to the reform process, the HNP reform is underfunded and the HNP itself is under-resourced. While the government’s annual budget has been increasing in past years, the percentage that is dedicated to the HNP is steadily decreasing – from 5.5% in 2006 to 4.8% in 2011. Since having a secure and stable environment is the main goal of the government, it should ensure the share of the HNP’s budget is growing in proportion with the increase in the government’s annual budget, not decreasing.

Most of the budget dedicated to the HNP is used for the payment of salaries, rather than the actual reform. Since the number of HNP graduates is growing and the HNP’s budget is decreasing, less and less money will be dedicated to the actual reform since the government will need to pay more salaries. Currently, MINUSTAH and bilateral donors such as USA and Canada are dominating the reform of HNP. As a result, many within the government see the reform process as imposed by the external actors, which leads to a lack of local ownership and political commitment. MINUSTAH cannot withdraw when the government is not fully committed to reforming its only security force, since the country’s stability and security would solely depend on the HNP after withdrawal of troops.

In order for the HNP to become a self-sufficient and responsible force, the government needs to shift its main focus from increasing the number of officers to ensuring that it is capable of fully funding and equipping the existing force. Furthermore, the government should focus on finishing the vetting process for the existing police officers (only 4,462 out of 12,678 have been vetted) and ensuring that the end number of officers is not higher than the number it can adequately manage without external help. It is best to have a well-functioning and well-equipped smaller force than larger force that is underequipped, undertrained and underpaid since such a force is more likely to be involved in human rights abuses.

Furthermore, the government needs to address the internal issues of the HNP. The HNP cannot properly function under its current regulatory system, which is composed of outdated and last minute 70 general orders, guidelines and standard operating procedures. A committee should be established to update and harmonize all of them and make sure that they reflect the current realities of the HNP.

Lastly, the hierarchy issues should be addressed. For example, the Inspectorate General, which is responsible for investigating public complaints and human rights violations and assessing the efficiency of the HNP, should be made an independent body. As it stands the Minister of Justice and Public Security, who has the power to dismiss the Inspector General, is also responsible for the functioning of the ministry. Thus the Inspector General has a tricky job of making sure that his recommendations will be acceptable to the Minister, otherwise, it could cost him/her his job. Indeed, the Inspector General has been replaced three times in 2012, which as the United Nations Secretary-General rightly pointes out does “raise questions about the independence and the effectiveness of the oversight body”.

As mentioned, the Government of Haiti has a lot to do before the withdrawal of the peacekeeping force. Since the HNP is clearly unready to take the bulk of the responsibility for security on itself, the government needs to show clear commitment to the reform of HNP and make it number one priority - if it does not want Haiti to fall back into chaos after the withdrawal of the UN troops.